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During the last few years maritime safety has greatly increased its importance. In 2000, 
International Maritime Organization initiated a major development project for passenger 
ship safety. The work was completed and amended to SOLAS regulations (International 
convention of Safety of Life at Sea). The most notable reform was the addition of Safe 
Return to Port (SRtP) and Orderly Evacuation regulations during fire- or flooding situa-
tions. 
 
SRtP regulations address situations where a space is considered lost or damaged be-
cause of a fire or a flooding casualty (after the fire is extinguished or flooded space is 
drained and/or isolated). Therefore all systems associated with the space are considered 
not to be in working order. In these situations, the space of casualty should be isolated 
from passengers and crew and checked for damages. All damaged SRtP systems capa-
bilities should be retained and possible Safe Area use for passengers and crew should be 
considered. The regulations are set as design criteria, not as operating criteria. All sys-
tem retaining operations must be done during a recovery time set by the operational 
requirements of the ship. The ship must be able to return safely to the nearest port in a 
pre-set time, depending on the operational requirements of the ship.   
 
This thesis introduced the new regulations and their demands to the reader, using a built 
reference ship for concrete examples. The objective of the thesis was to find new design 
concepts for systems related to SRtP and Orderly Evacuation regulations. The concepts 
should be as modular as possible so that the designs could be used in different ship lay-
out solutions. 
 
The development process starts by presenting the current regulations and used concepts 
of a chosen reference ship. The used reference ship is designed and built in Rauma 
shipyard  and  partially  fulfils  the  SRtP requirements.  These  reference  system concepts  
were analyzed, as well as the interpretations of the regulations and the ship’s operating 
procedures. Testing and support for the systems were also included in the review. 
 
The analysis showed that the ship’s operating procedures and current system designs did 
not  meet  in  a  desired  way -  despite  the  fact  that  the  demands  set  by  regulations  were  
met. It also showed that interpretations themselves contained obscurities. Based on the 
analysis, propulsion-, fuel oil-, fire main-, sprinkler-, bilge- and flooding systems were 
subjected to detailed development process. The ship’s flooding system was used as an 
example for practical financial calculations. 
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It was found out that all systems could be improved with different design concepts – 
most of them possessing modular qualities. Fuel oil system’s future concepts rely heav-
ily on environmental reforms. Also, a ships overall readiness for emergency situations 
could be improved by system integration, better operating procedures and sufficient 
training by the owners and shipyard.    
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Turvallisuudesta on tullut tärkeä osa telakkateollisuuden suunnittelua. Vuonna 2000 
Kansainvälinen merenkulkujärjestö uudisti laajamittaisesti säännöksiään koskien mat-
kustajien turvallisuutta matkustaja-aluksilla. Uudistuksista merkittävimpiä ovat matkus-
taja-alusten Safe Return to Port- ja Orderly Evacuation säännökset, jotka takaavat laivo-
jen turvallisuuden palo- ja vuototilanteissa sekä mahdollistavat rauhallisen evakuoinnin 
tarvittaessa. 
 
SRtP säännöksillä pyritään vaikuttamaan tilanteisiin, jossa laivan jokin tila on altistunut 
tulipalo- tai vuototilanteelle (sen jälkeen kun tilan palo on sammutettu tai vuoto eristet-
ty/tyhjennetty). Näin järjestelmän osat, jotka liittyvät jotenkin tilaan, oletetaan menete-
tyiksi. Tällaisissa tapauksissa vahingoittunut tila tulee eristää matkustajilta ja henkilös-
töltä. Lisäksi tulee suorittaa tarkistus vahinkojen laajuudesta. Kaikki SRtP säännöstön 
määrittelemät järjestelmät tulee palauttaa toimintakykyisiksi laivan vahingoittumatto-
missa tiloissa, ja mahdollisten turva-alueiden käyttöä tulisi harkita vahinkolaajuuden 
mukaan. Nämä toiminnot tulee suorittaa tietyssä palautumisajassa, joka riippuu laivan 
toiminnallisista vaatimuksista. Laivan tulee päästä turvallisesti lähimpään satamaan 
ennalta määrätyssä ajassa, riippuen myös toiminnallisista vaatimuksista. Säännökset 
ovat määrittelyjä suunnittelulle, eivät laivan operoinnille. 
 
Tämä diplomityö esittelee uudet säännökset ja niiden asettamat vaatimukset lukijalle 
käyttäen apuna jo valmistunutta referenssilaivaa. Työn tavoitteena oli löytää uusia mal-
leja SRtP (Safe Return to Port) ja evakuointi säännöksiin liittyvissä järjestelmissä. 
Suunnittelukonseptien tavoitteena on riittävä modulaarisuus, jotta niitä voitaisiin käyttää 
erilaisissa matkustaja-aluksien ratkaisuissa. 
 
Työssä esitellään aluksi vallitsevat säännökset ja referenssilaivassa käytetyt ratkaisut. 
Referenssilaivana käytetään Rauman telakalla rakennettua alusta, joka jo osittain täyttää 
SRtP vaatimukset. Nämä mallilaivan ratkaisut, sekä laivan hätätilanne proseduurit, ana-
lysoitiin kehityskohteiden löytämiseksi. Lisäksi sääntöjen tulkinnat itsessään analysoi-
tiin mahdollisia parannusehdotuksia varten. Katsauksessa otettiin huomioon myös mah-
dolliset tarpeet testausta ja teknillistä tukea ajatellen.   
 
Analysoinnin tulokset osoittivat, että operointimenetelmät ja käytetyt ratkaisumallit 
eivät kohdanneet halutulla tavalla, vaikkakin sääntöjen asettamat vaatimukset täyttyivät. 
Lisäksi todettiin, että sääntöjen tulkinnoissa löytyy kehitettävää jos halutaan löytää toi-
mivia kokonaisratkaisuja. Analysoinnin perusteella propulsio-, polttoaineensyöttö-, pa-
losammutus-, sprinkleri-, pilssi- sekä vuotojärjestelmä valittiin lähempää tarkastelua 
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varten. Vuotojärjestelmä valittiin konkreettiseksi esimerkiksi, jonka uuden ja vanhan 
ratkaisun välillä suoritettiin myös taloudelliset arviot. 
 
Kehitystyön tuloksena järjestelmille löydettiin uusia, modulaarisia ominaisuuksia sisäl-
täviä, ratkaisumalleja. Polttoaineensyötön mahdolliset ratkaisut ovat riippuvaisia tule-
vaisuuden ympäristömääräyksistä. Lisäksi huomattiin, että alusten kokonaisvaltaista 
valmiutta hätätilanteita varten pystyttäisiin parantamaan systeemi-integraation, parem-
pien operointimenetelmien ja riittävän koulutuksen avulla. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND MARKINGS 
 
Class Classification society: a body, exercising technical supervi-
sion over shipbuilding and navigation, and establishing 
technical and safety standards to ensure the seaworthiness 
of vessels. 
CP-propeller Controllable Pitch Propeller. 
Critical system Systems identified in the overall assessment process to have 
a possibility to fail to operate adequately as a result of a fire 
or flooding casualty. 
DDS Data Distribution Service. 
ECR Engine Control Room. 
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System. 
ERP Enterprise Level.  
Essential system All systems, or sections of systems, in spaces not directly 
affected by a flooding or fire casualty that need to remain 
operational according to SOLAS regulations. 
FMEA Failure Mode Effect Analysis. 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress Safety System. 
HFO Heavy Fuel Oil. 
HMI Human Machine Interface.  
IAS Integrated Automation System. 
IMO International Maritime Organization. 
LAN Local Area Network. 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas. 
MAL Management Level. 
MDO Marine Diesel Oil. 
MGO Marine Gas Oil. 
MSC Maritime Safety Committee. 
OSI Open System Interconnection. 
PA Public Address. 
PCS Process Control System. 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller. 
RoRo Roll On/Roll Off. 
RSP Redundant Steering Position. 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit. 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.  
SE Systems Engineering. 
SOLAS A maritime treaty for Safety of Life at Sea. A set of regula-
tions for maritime safety of vessels. 
SOS System of Systems 
SOSE System of Systems Engineering. 
x 
 
SRtP Safe Return to Port. 
UHF Ultra High Frequency. 
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply. 
VMC Ventilation Motor Control. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety is a concept which has greatly increased its meaning in all current fields of indus-
try. After the famous accident of RMS Titanic, passenger safety has become a major 
priority in marine industry. Since 1914, the onboard safety of ships has been improved 
with international treaties – most notably the International Convention for Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS). During the years, this treaty has been developed with constant 
amendments until the founding of the United Nations and the establishment of Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO). Since 1948 IMO has been the governing body for 
safety on seas with constantly updated regulations of SOLAS acting as its foundations. 
These regulations are followed by all 170 Member and Associate States. The safety reg-
ulations cover the whole life cycle of a ship, from designing phase through operational 
requirements to releasing the ship. 
One of IMO’s committees, Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), went through a ma-
jor development project of updating the safety regulations for passenger ships. In 2006, 
in the 82nd session of the MSC, a revised package of amendments to current regulations 
was agreed – most notably regulations of Safe Return to Port (SRtP). The aim of these 
regulations  was  to  switch  the  emphasis  more  on  preventing  casualties  from occurring,  
and to enhance the survivability of the ships. These regulations came to force in 1 July 
2010. 
SRtP regulations were developed to improve passenger safety in fire or flooding ca-
sualties during sea voyages. SRtP approach deals with situations where any given space 
of the ship is damaged because of a fire or a flooding scenario. Hence, all systems asso-
ciated with that space are considered to be out of order. In these types of scenarios, the 
space should be isolated from all seagoing persons and checked for possible damages. 
All damaged systems capabilities, under the scope of SRtP regulations, must be re-
tained; and Safe Areas should be used if there is any threat directly towards passengers 
or crew. The regulations are set as design criteria but do not suggest any operating crite-
ria  for  the  ship’s  personnel.  This  is  left  entirely  up  to  the  owner  and  operators  of  the  
ship. All operations retaining system capabilities must be done during a recovery time 
set by the operational requirements of the ship. The ship’s features must enable a safe 
return to the nearest port in a pre-set time, under certain weather criteria and minimum 
speed - depending on the operational requirements of the ship.  
1.1 Objective of the thesis 
The main aim for this thesis is to find new design patterns, concepts and possible mod-
ularity for different systems operating in passenger ships, under the new SRtP regula-
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tions for car passenger ferries, through systems engineering process – especially SRtP 
systems with a possibility for automated and/or remote controlled features.  
As technology develops rapidly and demands for safety onboard through regulations 
become even stricter, STX Finland AS (Rauma shipyard) continues to pursuit more ef-
ficient, customer friendly, concepts for safety related systems, and to explore the use of 
automation as a means for more operator friendly solutions. This thesis will try to fur-
ther develop the SRtP process and system designs used in the shipyard - approaching 
problems more from the user’s point-of-view but keeping in mind the economical and 
technical realities faced by the designers. Also, as the SRtP regulations are new and yet 
hardly in use, one objective is to raise questions and promote new ideas for further de-
velopment and standardization of the rules and their interpretations. 
1.2 Thesis structure 
The development process is carried out by examining the new regulations and existing 
applications in a chosen reference vessel according to systems engineering (SE) and 
system of systems engineering (SOSE) methods. The regulations, used interpretations 
and all needed background information regarding the SRtP process are presented in 
chapter 2.  In chapters 3 and 4, the SRtP systems of the reference vessel are introduced. 
These chapters also describe the current concepts used for each system to fulfill the 
SRtP requirements.  The ship’s capabilities in SRtP situations are analyzed, as a single 
entity and system by system. The systems are analyzed based on new interpretations of 
the regulations and certain criteria to determine which of the systems could be further 
developed. The analyzing process is explained in chapter 5. These systems are exposed 
to SE process and the ship as a whole to SOSE process. User requirements and feedback 
are gathered by interviewing the operators of the reference vessel. The new concept 
ideas are introduced in chapter 6. Conclusions of the whole process and recommenda-
tions for further work are presented in chapter 7. 
1.3 Reference vessel 
A reference vessel is chosen for concrete examples, figures and specific ship layout. 
The reference vessel partially complies with the SRtP regulations (flooding scenarios 
are excluded and some demands have been lowered). The ship is called Spirit of Britain 
and it is a RoRo-passenger (Roll on/Roll off) ferry operating between Dover and Calais. 
It was built in the STX Finland AS (Rauma shipyard) and was delivered on 5 January 
2011. The vessel is intended for 2200 seagoing persons and dedicated cargo, mainly 
different types of vehicles. The ship is approximately 213 meters long, 31 meters in 
breadth and its draught is 6.5 meters. Tonnage is 49 000 tons.  The ship has two shaft 
lines with CP-propellers (Controllable Pitch Propellers), both lines operated by two 
heavy fuel oil main engines. Four auxiliary engines supply the electric network of the 
vessel. Maximum speed of the vessel is 22.0 knots. [1] 
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The ship’s centralized automation system, IAS (Integrated Automation System), is 
designed to comply with the regulations of an unattended engine room. That is to say 
that all normally conditioned machinery operations, requiring attendance at frequency of 
less than 24 hours, are covered by an unmanned automation system. All control systems 
and functions for continuous remote and/or automatic control are provided with proven 
redundancy. All alarms and most of the monitoring and control functions are handled by 
IAS. Ship’s individual systems may possess their own automation systems which con-
nected to IAS. The system includes 3050 I/O points and additional 10% as spare points 
with several serial line interfaces to other systems. A fully automated power management 
system for four diesel generators and four shaft generators works as part of IAS. [2] 
The basic architecture for IAS cabinet layout and cabling is shown in figure 1.1 (Ap-
pendix 1). 
1.4 System design process 
Systems, and their features, discussed in this thesis are approached from two separate 
perspectives; through SE or through SOSE. Both approaches are used. Ship’s features 
can be divided into single systems which combined together, and with the personnel of 
the ship, comprise a more complex meta-system. This system of systems needs to be 
approached differently than any single system. SE is used to find new designs and con-
cepts for single systems, SOSE when the operations of the whole ship - its capabilities 
and personnel - are examined. 
1.4.1 Systems engineering 
SE can be described as an interdisciplinary field of engineering. The purpose of SE is to 
find  new  ways  to  design  and  manage  difficult  engineering  projects.  Normally,  SE  
should cover the whole life cycle of the project, from designing to implementation and 
testing, even recycling.  
A system is generally thought to be a synonym for a product. According to Stevens, 
instead of solely focusing on the end product we should examine the full operational 
capability of a system, providing the user with all the necessary services and not just the 
end product [3]. The end product is a valuable part of a system but operational proce-
dures, support processes and possible training must be integrated into the design 
process. Stevens states this as an operational environment, consisting of multiple exter-
nal systems interacting with the product – consisting of cooperating or competing sys-
tems [3]. Development environment is needed to produce a convincing operational envi-
ronment and a quality end product (figure 1.2). A development environment consists of 
development support systems, such as infrastructure, test and verification systems. 
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Figure 1.2. Development and operational environment [3] 
 
Operational environment is considered to be the complete ending of a system’s life 
cycle. The cycle starts from user requirements and follows a sequential development 
process consisting of system requirements, architectural design and testing of integra-
tion, installation and operations. According to Stevens, feedback and testing between 
these stages are important milestones for the quality of the system. When information is 
produces in this order, it will ensure that users, developers and designers have all the 
data that they require for a successful product. This will also guarantee that all compo-
nents of the design process are thought to be part of a larger entity and are more easily 
integrated into a complete system. [3.]  
A system engineer is in charge of the process during the whole life cycle, from ab-
stract stages in the beginning through detailed implementations. System engineer should 
balance all competing factors (risk, cost, performance) while ensuring that user re-
quirement demands and practicality remain a high priority. It is easier to comprehend a 
small simple system as a single entity instead of larger, more complex, one. Stevens 
claims that, for larger systems, overall behavior emerges only when the complete sys-
tem can be seen as a single entity [3]. As so, the sequential development process is 
invalid when dealing with large-scale systems. In these cases, when sequential devel-
opment process cannot be used due to system complexity or magnitude, SOSE approach 
becomes valid.  
Figure  1.3  shows  the  role  of  SE  in  a  system’s  life  cycle  process  until  a  practical  
compromise is reached. The objective is to have a compatible set of user and system 
requirements, design, cost and practicality before implementing a system [3]. 
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Figure 1.3. Role for SE [3]. 
 
In this thesis, the whole system life cycle will not be examined thoroughly. The partial 
examination will focus more on user and system requirements, architectural design and 
practicality. Costs and quality will be acknowledged in the design process but cannot be 
realistically estimated - only one system is chosen as a concrete example for economical 
calculations. Feedback is gathered from system designers and from the operators of the 
reference vessel. To provide a competent operational environment, the testing and sup-
port of the systems are also analyzed. 
1.4.2 System of Systems Engineering 
The term system of systems engineering is relatively new, although the study of com-
plex  systems  as  a  domain  is  far  older.  System  of  systems  (SOS)  type  problems  were  
already studied in mid 1900s and complex interactions between system dates back even 
further [4.]. In this thesis, the definition for SOSE covers the following aspects [4, see 
5]: 
 
x SOS involves integration of multiple, independent, systems into a meta-system 
x SOS generates capabilities beyond any constituent systems working indepen-
dently 
x integration into a SOS may cause some constrain for previously independent 
systems 
x SOS performs tasks where separate systems are an integral part but could not 
accomplish the tasks as independent systems 
 
Current SOSE development can be divided into two separate paths: technical and in-
quiry – shown in Table 1.4. The technical path studies systems from a technically domi-
nated perspective, dealing with interoperability, information technology, net-centricity, 
integration etcetera. Technical perspective aims for an integrated product and is closely 
related to SE. The inquiry path is more related to ‘soft systems’ thinking, concerned 
with human/social, contextual and high level inquiry to complex system problems. [4] 
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Table 1.4. Bifurcation in SOSE field development [4]. 
Attribute     SOSE field development paths 
    SOSE (Technical)   SOSE (Inquiry) 
Primary focus     Technical product     Inquiry processes   
Result of effort   Hardware / software solution  Purposeful response  
Driving paradigm   Hard systems   Soft systems  
Foreground approach  Systematic    Systemic   
Background approach  Systemic    Systematic   
Results acceptance   Objective    Interpretative  
Closest related field perspective Systems engineering     Systems thinking   
 
Even though the bifurcation presents an opportunity for multiple perspectives, SOSE 
must evolve into one methodology according to Souza-Poza [4]. This way all aspects 
are taken into consideration and all synergies can be utilized. This thesis will use SOSE 
concept when applying new rules and concepts that concern the vessel as a single entity. 
SOSE method will  be the basis for a meta-system that is  the whole ship,  consisting of 
independent systems and the personnel using them. The aim is to ensure that all new 
requirements by authorities and operators are met in safe, practical, economical and 
user-friendly way. This is done by using as much of already existing features as possi-
ble, creating new synergies and ensuring that the ship is equipped to handle all emer-
gency situations. 
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2 RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Shipbuilding is an industry where most operations are largely defined and scrutinized by 
different set of rules and regulations, mostly aiming to enhance maritime safety, effi-
ciency of navigation, and prevention and control of marine pollution of ships. The basic 
rules, regulations and standards for shipbuilding are set on an international level by 
IMO. These and other optional or additional regulations are enforced over a vessel by a 
flag state: a vessel is registered under a flag state which is responsible for the vessel’s 
official inspections, certificates, and documents. The vessel also operates under the ad-
miralty  laws  of  the  state.  From  here  on,  the  Government  of  the  State  whose  flag  the  
ships is entitled to fly is addressed as Administration. Normally Administration autho-
rizes a non-governmental Classification Society (Class) to oversee that the interpreta-
tions of the rules, regulations and standards during the construction phase of the vessel 
are followed. [6] 
The regulations are presented to the reader for background information, and to un-
derstand what sort of requirements the new regulations place on system design.  
2.1 SOLAS 
On 1 November 1974 IMO convened The International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea. The SOLAS convention is widely regarded as the most important treaty for 
maritime safety. SOLAS regulations were entered into force on 25 May 1980 and have 
been regularly updated since: twice by means of protocol (1978 SOLAS protocol and 
1988 SOLAS protocol) and numerous amendments by means of resolutions – mostly by 
MSC. [6.] Updates are necessary keeping up with the rapid development of technology 
and the increasing problems with maritime pollution. 
SOLAS regulations define different standards and rules for shipbuilding. The aim of 
these rules is to standardize different vessels and systems so that they meet the increas-
ing requirements for passenger safety, environmental issues, and demands for carriage 
of cargoes and dangerous goods. All SOLAS regulations do not apply to every single 
type of vessel. Depending on the type, certain regulations have to be put into force. On-
ly Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) of the SOLAS regulations applies to all  vessels -  
except warships, naval auxiliaries and other non-commercial ships owned and operated 
by the Contracting Government. [6] 
SOLAS regulations define a passenger ship as follows: “A passenger ship is a ship 
which carries more than twelve passengers.” [6, p.15] A car passenger ferry is therefore 
classified as a passenger ship and complies with the regulations for a passenger ship. 
[6.]  
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2.2 Safe Return to Port 
Safe  Return  to  Port  ideology is  based  on  the  regulations  8-1,  Chapter  II-1  of  SOLAS 
and regulation 21, Chapter II-2 of SOLAS. Chapter II-1 consists of regulations for con-
struction of structure, subdivision and stability, machinery and electric installations. 
Chapter II-2 of SOLAS consists of regulations for construction of fire protection, fire 
detection and fire extinction. These regulations were amended to SOLAS in 2006 by the 
MSC of IMO and are part of the resolution MSC.216(82) (annex 2 and 3). [6; 7; 8] 
The regulations are applied according to the following instruction: “Passenger ships 
constructed on or after 1 July 2010 having a length, as defined in regulation II-1/2.5, of 
120 m or more or having three or more main vertical zones shall comply with the provi-
sions of this regulation.” [7, p.49; p.79] 
The purpose of the regulation 21 is to establish design criteria for a ship’s safe re-
turn to port with its own propulsion system after a fire casualty which does not exceed 
casualty threshold. Regulation 8-1 sets the same requirements in case of flooding in 
watertight compartments. Also, the ship must provide a safe area for passengers which 
fulfills the functional requirements and performance standards described in the regula-
tion. A casualty threshold includes a loss of space of fire origin up to the nearest “A” 
class boundary (either part of the space of fire origin or spaces next to it) if the space is 
protected by a fixed fire-extinguishing system; or a loss of the space of fire origin and 
adjacent spaces up to the nearest “A” class boundaries which are not part of the space of 
fire origin if it is not protected by a fixed fire-extinguishing system [8]. “A” class boun-
dary is formed by either bulkheads and/or decks constructed of steel (or other equivalent 
material), which are suitably stiffened, insulated with approved non-combustible mate-
rials, do not allow the passage of smoke and flames (to the end of one-hour standard fire 
test) and are approved by the Class [6; 7].  
An example of layout for spaces of fire origin is presented in figure 2.1. “A” class 
boundaries are marked with red line color and spaces of fire origins are numbered for 
scenario listing (numbering is arranged by: deck - main fire zone - running space num-
ber). 
 
Figure 2.1. “A” class boundaries and spaces of fire origin [9.] 
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In order to be deemed capable of returning to port safely, the following systems must 
remain operational after a fire casualty (Regulation 21) and/or when the ship is subject 
to flooding in any watertight compartment (Regulation 8-1) [7; 8]: 
 
x Propulsion system 
x Steering and steering control systems 
x Navigational systems 
x Systems for fill, transfer and service of fuel oil 
x Internal communications system 
x External communications system 
x Fire main system 
x Fixed fire-extinguishing systems 
x Fire and smoke detection system 
x Bilge and ballast systems 
x Power-operated watertight doors 
x Systems intended to support Safe Areas 
x Flooding detection system 
x Other systems determined by the Administration to be vital to damage control 
efforts 
 
Generally, production and distribution of electric power as well as the automation sys-
tem(s) of the ship are included to the list.  
As described above, Safe Area(s) are to be provided in SRtP situations. A Safe 
Area(s) should be an internal space(s); however, the use of external spaces can be al-
lowed  with  the  agreement  of  the  Class.  Sanitation,  water,  food,  medical  care,  shelter,  
means  of  preventing  heat  stress  and  hypothermia,  light  and  ventilation  have  to  be  ar-
ranged for the passengers and crew members. Ventilation must be designed in a way 
which reduces the risk of smoke and hot gases entering the Safe Area. There must be 
means of access to life-saving appliances from the Safe Area(s), taking into account the 
possibility of a loss of a complete vertical fire zone. [7; 8] 
A SRtP mode in a ship refers to a situation where a space is considered lost or dam-
aged because of a fire or a flooding casualty (after the fire is extinguished or flooded 
space is drained/isolated). Therefore all systems associated with the space are consi-
dered not to be in working order – in worst the case scenario. When a ship is in SRtP 
mode, the space of casualty should be isolated from passengers and crew and checked 
for damages. All damaged SRtP systems capabilities should be retained and possible 
Safe Area use for passengers and crew should be considered - depending on the scena-
rio. The use of Safe Areas in SRtP situations is not clearly stated in the rules, as regula-
tions are set as design criteria of the ship – not as operating criteria. All operations must 
be done during a recovery time set by the operational requirements of the ship (recovery 
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time for the reference vessel is two hours). The ship must be able to return safely to the 
nearest port in a pre-set time, also depending on the operational requirements of the 
ship.   
2.3 Orderly evacuation 
Regulation 22, Chapter II-2 of SOLAS further complements the SRtP ideology and reg-
ulations. The rule is applied as described for regulations 8-1 and 21 in the previous pa-
ragraph. The regulation deals with fire scenarios where the casualty threshold is ex-
ceeded, meaning a loss of an entire vertical fire zone or main fire zone. In these situa-
tions the regulation states that the following systems must remain operational to support 
orderly evacuation and abandonment of the ship [7; 8]: 
 
x Fire main system 
x Internal communications systems   
x External communications system 
x Bilge and ballast systems 
x Emergency lighting (escape routes, assembly stations, embarkation stations) 
x Guidance systems for evacuation 
 
Production and distribution of electric power is needed to guarantee the operation of the 
above listed systems. Therefore, in most vessel types, systems for fill, transfer and ser-
vice of fuel oil are required to be in working order.  
The above systems must remain capable of operation for at least 3 hours (assumed 
that that other parts of the ship are not affected by fire). These systems are not required 
to remain operational within the damaged areas. [7; 8] 
2.4 Safety Centre 
SRtP and orderly evacuation regulations are designed to improve the technical aspects 
of the ship for passenger safety, whereas the Safety Centre is more of a concept de-
signed to assist with the management in emergency situations. Regulation 23, Chapter 
II-2 of SOLAS states that all passenger ships constructed after 1 July 2010 must have on 
board a Safety Centre [7; 8].  
The Safety Centre must be a space, part of the navigation bridge or a separate adja-
cent space next to it (with direct access to the bridge). This is to ensure that the man-
agement process can be performed without distracting watch officers from their naviga-
tional duties. The centre must have means of communication to the central control sta-
tion, navigation bridge (if not part of it), the engine control room, the storage room(s) 
(for fire-extinguishing system(s)) and fire equipment lockers. [7; 8] 
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The Safety Centre must provide full functionality (operation, control, monitoring or 
potential combination of the previous three) of the following safety systems – despite 
possible requirements set elsewhere: 
 
x Powered ventilation systems 
x Fire doors 
x General emergency alarm system 
x Public address system 
x Evacuation guidance system 
x Watertight (and semi-watertight) doors 
x Indication of shell doors, loading doors and other closing appliances 
x Water leakage of bow doors, stern doors and any other shell door 
x Television surveillance system 
x Fire detection and alarm system 
x Fixed fire-fighting local application system(s) 
x Sprinkler and equivalent systems 
x Water-based fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces 
x Alarm to summon crew 
x Atrium smoke extraction system 
x Flooding detection system 
x Fire pumps and emergency fire pumps 
   
The Safety Centre does not have to be considered part of the SRtP ideology, that is to 
say, it does not have to be in working order in all flooding or fire casualty scenarios of 
the ship. In SRtP sense, it is not redundant. 
2.5 Interim explanatory notes 
In shipbuilding the standards, regulations and rules for construction of a vessel are not 
absolute. There are always at least three different points-of-view to be considered: shi-
pyard, Class and the owner of the ship. Although the regulations are to be followed as 
set, there is always room for interpretations. As a result, there is constant dialogue be-
tween the shipyard, owner and the Class. Therefore IMO publishes interim explanatory 
notes for new regulations, and updates them regularly as they evolve with design and 
construction experience. 
In this thesis, interpretations for regulations 8-1 of chapter II-1 and 22, 23 of chapter 
II-2 are followed according to IMO’s recommendations demonstrated in Circula-
tion.1369, approved in the 87th session of Maritime Safety Committee in London (from 
12 to 21 May 2010). The interpretations aim to clarify the regulations in a way where 
there is less room for speculation and that all parties involved know the boundaries 
within they can act. The explanatory notes are intended to outline the process of verifi-
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cation and approval of a ship’s design, and to describe the necessary documentation 
required when SRtP regulations are applied. Also, explanatory notes give detailed de-
sign  criteria  for  designers  on  what  is  acceptable  and  what  is  not  –  for  example  when  
pipes or cables are considered lost, when fire insulation is needed etcetera.  
Design  process  of  SRtP  systems  should  include  a  written  description  of  all  of  the  
systems to be installed and all the information how to achieve systems’ capabilities and 
functionality after a casualty. Starting point for the assessment process is that the operat-
ing patterns (maximum area of operation and/or routes, maximum number of passengers 
and crew, type of vessel and so forth) have been defined by the owner. All of the system 
capabilities build into the ship will depend on the operating patterns. [10] 
The design process should be carried out in a way that the following information is 
acquired, documented and delivered to the Class and the owner: ship’s description and 
assessment of ship’s capabilities; including overall assessment of essential systems and 
detailed assessment for critical systems. Ship’s description must contain information on 
the design criteria for essential systems, the basic layout of the vessel, criteria for the 
selection of Safe Areas, list of essential systems intended for assessment process, design 
documentation for essential systems, data regarding the minimum speed versus weather 
and sea conditions, and any additional information considered important for design. The 
operating patterns should be included in the ship’s description. The basic layout may 
include information on compartment boundaries, general arrangement plan, capacity 
plan, watertight subdivision plan, structural fire protection plan and plan of spaces pro-
tected by fixed fire-extinguishing systems. [10] 
Assessment of ship’s capabilities should be performed by the process shown in fig-
ure 2.2 (Appendix 2). The assessment should be based on structured methods and 
should document the intended essential systems’ functionality after a casualty scenario. 
The SOLAS regulations do not determine any quantities or performance limits; there-
fore ship’s ability to return to port safely is linked only to the operating patterns. The 
capability of each system in a worst case scenario should be presented in the on board 
documentation. 
When the overall assessment process is concluded, results define the need for possi-
ble detailed assessment process for critical systems. That is to say, if no critical systems 
were found during the overall assessment, the overall assessment can be considered 
acceptable without the need for a detailed analysis. However, if critical systems were 
found,  a  detailed  assessment  of  any  critical  system  is  needed.  Detailed  assessment  
should supplement the ship’s description by giving details on power supply, pipes, 
cables, devices and connections of the system. Details of possible manual actions must 
be included, as well as details of any operational solution forming part of the design 
criteria. Additional information can be included in form of quantitative analysis (for 
example fire risk within a space), FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis) or analysis 
regarding consequences of flooding within a space. [10] 
All above mentioned information must be documented for approval and for on board 
documentation. Additional information is needed for test programs and maintenance 
13 
 
plan. Record of ship systems’ capabilities should be added to the list of operational limi-
tations for ship’s safety management manual. [10]   
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3 SRTP SYSTEMS 
Feedback from the operators suggests that SRtP systems could be further developed 
from an operator’s point-of-view [11]. At the same time, the costs for new concepts and 
models should be kept in tolerable level. The aim is to give a possible buyer economi-
cally competitive, yet quality, concepts to choose from - while ensuring that the system 
costs do not go up excessively due to the SRtP regulations.  
For this reason, SRtP systems’ capabilities and requirements should be assessed. 
Some systems could be used for more accurate decision making, some actions could be 
avoided or perhaps economically remote controlled. Even the SRtP regulations and in-
terpretations themselves could be improved or they might require clarification or mod-
ifications. First, the SRtP systems must be examined and explained. This is done by 
examining the used concepts in the reference vessel. This determines the system re-
quirements placed by the SRtP rules. 
After the systems have been introduced to the reader, they are analyzed for potential 
further development. Same analysis will be carried out for dominant regulations and 
interpretations. This is done by using feedback from the owners and the personnel of the 
shipyard, as well as estimating future trends for SRtP development of systems. This 
determines the user requirements for SE, and provides a platform for better quality of 
the product. 
3.1 Propulsion system 
Propulsion system can be considered as one of the hardest, and most complex, systems 
to deal with regarding SRtP regulations. Propulsion system is dependent on other sys-
tems to work properly and this must be taken into consideration. In our reference ship, 
the basic principle has been the use of two shaft lines, both supported by two main en-
gines (four in total), placed in separate main engine rooms – each engine room assigned 
to serve only one shaft line. In any casualty scenario, one complete shaft line (and its 
auxiliary systems) should stay operational. The port side shaft line passes through the 
after main engine room and is enclosed in “A” class trunk to retain its capabilities in 
after main engine room casualty scenarios.  
A propulsion shaft line is directly connected to the following systems: shaft genera-
tor, reduction gear, shaft bearings, stern tube and its lubrication system, CP-propeller 
system, fresh- and sea water cooling systems, lubrication oil system, compressed air 
system and main engine room ventilation. These systems are equipped with different 
SRtP features to preserve shaft line operability in SRtP situations. Also, functional fuel 
oil system is required which will be examined in paragraph 5.4. Main engines and their 
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auxiliary systems are already well supervised and controlled. Main engines have their 
own supplier delivered automation system, connected to IAS for alarm indications and 
control. Most auxiliary systems are supervised and controlled by IAS. Automatic opera-
tions should be avoided as propulsion power should not be exposed to errors or mal-
functions. Most of the manual actions are related to compressed air system and water 
cooling system isolations. 
Currently, there are four interpretations for propulsion system (interpretations 17-
20). Interpretation 18 states that, in a SRtP situation, the ship must maintain a minimum 
speed of 6 knots for sufficient time while heading into Beaufort 8 weather and corres-
ponding sea conditions [10]. Interpretation 19 explains the survival of the shaft line in 
flooding or fire situations. The shaft line and relevant bearings must be either enclosed 
in an “A” class tunnel or it must be proved that it can operate under water and is pro-
tected by a dedicated water spray system to survive a fire/flooding casualty [10]. Inter-
pretation 20 approves the use of local controls if adequate communications and emer-
gency lightings are arranged [10].  
3.2 Steering and steering control systems 
The principle of steering system, in Spirit of Britain, resembles the propulsion system’s 
model. There are two separate, hydraulic operated, rudders – located at the after port- 
and starboard side of the ship. Hydraulic power packs are located in assigned steering 
gear rooms with other essential machinery. The power supplies for steering machineries 
are duplicated from main- and emergency switchboard. Control and indication of both 
rudders are arranged to three locations: bridge, redundant steering position (RSP) or 
locally. This means that in any casualty scenario at least one rudder is operational from 
one of the three operating locations. As with propulsion systems, the system for steering 
does not require a lot of actions, and automatic operations should be avoided.  
Interpretation 20 approves the use of local controls (when adequate communication 
and emergency lighting are arranged) and the use of alternative means for steering, such 
as azimuth thrusters, pump jets, rudders, propellers but the use of tunnel thrusters 
should not be considered [10]. 
3.3 Navigational systems 
The navigational systems in SRtP sense contain various systems from simple gadgets to 
more advanced systems. In the reference vessel, the redundancy is secured in two dif-
ferent  ways:  with  RSP,  situated  at  the  top  of  the  ship,  with  access  to  redundant  fixed  
systems; and with portable units. Table 3.1. shows all navigational systems and how 
redundancy is arranged. 
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Table 3.1. Navigational systems [12]. 
Requirement  Item Portable unit Fixed system 
Available in a) barograph X - 
another  hand wind speed meter X - 
location  device to receive weather forecast maps - X 
 b) compass and bearing repeater - X 
 c) nautical charts and publications or ECDIS X - 
 d) receiver for global navigation satellite system - X 
 e) rudder, propeller thrust and pitch indicators - X 
 f) 9 GHz radar - X 
 g) automatic identification system - X 
Should  a) whistle - X 
remain  b) navigation lights - X 
operational c) daylight signal lamp X - 
 
The location for RSP is determined by the contract specification and is not influenced 
by any SRtP related regulation or interpretation. As so, the RSP could be placed any-
where on the ship.  
The fixed systems are divided into two categories: navigational equipment and sig-
naling systems. Signaling systems should remain operational at all times, whereas navi-
gational equipment must be available after a SRtP scenario. 
Device to receive weather forecast maps is provided via ship’s VSAT satellite 
communication. The redundancy is arranged by using a Fleet33 back-up antenna, not 
part of any casualty scenario, as the primary antenna. The compass and bearing repeater 
is  provided  by  two  gyro  compasses  with  a  redundant  signal  to  RSP.  Also,  there  is  a  
magnetic compass on an open deck - not part of any casualty scenario or dependent on 
external power supply. Global navigation satellite- and automatic identification systems 
use a DGPS satellite signal in normal use. There is a back-up system in RSP with a ded-
icated  GPS  antenna  when  the  primary  signal  cannot  be  used.  The  radar  system  is  ar-
ranged as to use X-band radar scanner signal at the bridge as a primary option. A ma-
nual changeover for the signal is provided in RSP if the equipment at the bridge is dam-
aged. Also, the bow X-band scanner can be used as a secondary unit. 
Whistle system uses an electronic whistle as a primary unit and a pneumatic operat-
ed typhoon as secondary unit. The typhoon is connected to the ship’s working air sys-
tem and has one dedicated isolation valve. The navigation and signal lights are divided 
into two independent power- and distribution networks. The primary control station is 
located at the bridge, the secondary unit in RSP. System cabling is designed in a way 
that either lighting network is in working order at all times. 
As described above, many of the navigational systems do not require manual actions 
in the conventional sense. Most “actions” are simply switching on secondary equip-
ment, using back-up systems or –signals. In Spirit of Britain the RSP contains all navi-
gational back-up systems. According to regulations and interpretations, all of the fixed 
systems in table 3.1 should be considered as SRtP navigational systems. In addition, 
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most ships build in Rauma shipyard will be equipped with an ECDIS (Electronic Chart 
Display and Information System) which should also be considered as part of SRtP sys-
tems. Additional systems are possible but dependable of contract specifications. 
3.4 Systems for fill, transfer and service of fuel oil 
The basic principle of the fuel oil system is presented in figure 3.2. (Appendix 3). In 
normal conditions the machinery is operated with HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil) but can use 
MDO (Marine Diesel Oil) as a secondary fuel. The HFO tanks are located in fuel oil 
treatment room with feeder and booster units – with the exception of booster unit serv-
ing after main engines. In normal running mode, the feeder/booster units supply HFO to 
both main engine rooms. In SRtP scenarios, involving the fuel oil system, the supply 
piping between main engine rooms is cut off with manually operated isolation valves 
and the system is split into two independent circuits. This requires changing fuel oil 
from HFO to MDO. This is done by either using remote operated valves from IAS or 
locally next to the units. Also, the sludge and drain oil system must be split into own 
circuits by manually operated valves, if the fore part of the system is damaged. There is 
an intermediate tank for after main engine room’s drain oil. All necessary power sup-
plies are duplicated. 
The interpretations state that the fuel oil system must be guaranteed when propul-
sion and power generation equipment is active. The regulations also apply to other 
flammable liquids and fluids dangerous if heated to high temperatures (within pipes or 
in equipments) [10]. In these scenarios the part of the system within the damaged space 
must be considered nonoperational.  
If same type of arrangements is used for fuel oil systems in the future, there could be 
potential for automatic or remote controlled features. For example, turning off fuel 
supply to a space with a fire alarm could be arranged by IAS. Also, splitting the system 
into two independent circuits could be remote controlled. 
3.5 Internal communications system 
Spirit of Britain has two separate internal communication systems: PA (Public Address) 
system and UHF (Ultra High Frequency) radio telephone system. The PA system con-
sists of two independently operating main racks with designated loudspeaker networks - 
extending over the entire ship. Both main racks have a duplicated power supply. An-
nouncement units are located at the bridge and in ECR (Engine Control Room). Wire-
less UHF radio telephone system uses two set of antenna networks, both main racks 
having their own branches. The antenna networks use a leaky coaxial cable to provide a 
larger wireless network area. Fixed radio stations are located at the bridge and ECR, and 
there are three charger units around the ship for portable radio telephones. 
According to interpretations, internal communication must be provided by fixed or 
portable means of communication. Portable system is approved if repeater (or equiva-
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lent) remains operational after a casualty and there is charging capability in more than 
one main fire zone. The PA system (general alarm system) must remain operational in 
all other main fire zones except the zone where a space or the entire fire zone is lost. 
[10] 
The internal communication systems have been found easy to use and functional. 
Special interest should be placed on cable routing for UHF system as all compartments 
of the ship should be reachable in any SRtP scenario. 
3.6 External communications system 
External communication system is comprised of fixed and portable GMDSS (Global 
Maritime Distress Safety System) equipment. GMDSS is an international agreement for 
communication protocols, safety procedures, equipment and so forth to help rescuing 
distressed naval vessels. In the reference vessel, the redundancy for GMDSS equipment 
is arranged by placing redundant equipment in two different main fire zones: the fixed 
GMDSS unit is located at the bridge, with a charger unit for portable equipment at the 
Safety Center. A second portable unit charger is placed in office room at deck 8 – in 
different main fire zone. 
The current interpretations demand portable GMDSS equipment by stating that a 
ship  should  be  capable  of  communicating  via  GMDSS  even  when  the  fixed  GMDSS  
unit is not operational [10]. 
3.7 Fire main system 
The fire main system consists of three main vertical riser lines, connected by four main 
horizontal pipes. Together they form a ringline-type backbone for the system. The basic 
idea is presented in figure 3.3. (Appendix 4). The vertical riser lines are enclosed in fire 
proved “A-60” rated trunks from deck 5 to the top of deck 7. Each trunk comprises of 
two valve centers. Valve centers are connected to each other by the main horizontal 
pipes at decks 5 and 7. The valve centers are not considered part of any casualty scena-
rio and thus are always operational. In all cases, one complete horizontal line between 
valve centers is intact. As so, all valve centers are connected to each other and opera-
tional in every SRtP and Orderly evacuation scenario. 
The backbone network is supplied by three fire pumps, using sea water from three 
sea chests. The capacity of two fire pumps is enough to provide sufficient system pres-
sure. The pumps are located so that only one pump at a time can be lost during an SRtP 
scenario. Water from the pumps is led to the valve centers and distributed to fire hy-
drants around the ship. The ship is divided into sections containing a specific number of 
fire hydrants. All sections can be isolated by manually operating a section isolation 
valve from a valve center. Needed distribution pipe segments between fire hydrants and 
valve centers are fire insulated. 
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The interpretations state that while an automatic start for remaining pumps is advis-
able, it is not obligatory, and that manual local start may be accepted. They also demand 
that all intact spaces after a casualty must be accessible with fire hoses, either from the 
same or adjacent main fire zone. [10] 
3.8 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems 
Fixed fire-extinguishing systems are divided into four sub-categories: drencher system, 
CO2 system, sprinkler system and fire main take-offs. Drencher system protects the 
trailer decks of the Spirit of Britain using sea water. CO2 system is intended for protec-
tion of main engine rooms, fuel oil treatment room and emergency generator room, and 
operates by replacing oxygen with CO2 from the space. Sprinkler system protects al-
most all other manned spaces of the ship, not protected by other fixed fire-extinguishing 
systems. Fire main take-offs are specially designed solutions for specific problems in 
the design of the reference vessel. 
3.8.1 Drencher system 
Drencher system is supplied by two drencher pumps located at forward and after main 
engine rooms. In case one pump is lost, there is an emergency connection to fire main 
system where two fire pumps are needed to replace one drencher pump. The pumps 
supply sea water to main distribution network, which is enclosed within a fireproofed 
“A-60” rated trunk.  
Trailer decks are divided into drencher sections and each section has a designated 
manually operable section valve – also protected by the trunk. The system is a dry pipe 
system and water is supplied with a constant pressure only to the trunk. From the trunk, 
water is supplied to the nozzles if the section valve is operated. 
Regulations and interpretations state that one section can only serve one deck area in 
one main vertical zone – except in stairways where all levels can be protected by the 
same section. Section valves must be protected by “A-class” fire insulation or specific 
water nozzles. [10] 
Drencher system could be considered as a system for further development.  Instead 
of manually operating a valve from a location with difficult access, valves could be re-
mote controlled from an always manned position. 
3.8.2 CO2 system 
CO2 fire-extinguishing system is intended for main engine rooms, fuel oil treatment 
room and emergency generator room. Fuel oil treatment room is equipped with two sep-
arate pipelines for redundancy. The CO2 is stored in a separate CO2 room. Releasing of 
the CO2 can be performed locally (by manually opening the bottle valves) or from 
pneumatic remote controlled switches from emergency control space. All spaces are 
equipped with both audio and visual alarms – subjected to SRtP ruling. 
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Current interpretations demand that the capacity of the CO2 should be enough to 
protect two of the largest spaces. Additionally, there should be two rooms – not part of a 
same casualty scenario – both containing enough CO2 for protecting the largest space. 
If one of the protected spaces is lost, it should not affect the functionality of the system 
in other protected spaces. [10] 
Development of CO2 could focus on examining the possibility of remote control 
from a combined emergency interface. The amount of machinery space in most ships 
built in Rauma is unlikely to increase. As so, the CO2 system arrangement will proba-
bly remain as described above. 
3.8.3 Sprinkler system 
A pressurized sprinkler system resembles fire main system’s basic principle. The back-
bone distribution piping is formed by six valve centers, enclosed into three “A-60” rated 
fire proofed trunks (same valve centers as in fire main system). Valve centers are con-
nected by a fire insulated horizontal main pipe at deck 7. The distribution network is 
supplied by a sprinkler pumping unit, supplied with a duplicated power supply. The unit 
uses  fresh  water  from fresh  water  tanks.  Fresh  water  is  used  to  avoid  corrosion  in  the  
piping network. For redundancy, there is also a connection to fire main system if the 
sprinkler pump unit is not operable.  
From the valve centers, the water is distributed to designated sprinkler sections with 
individual piping. Piping is arranged from the top or bottom part of the trunk.  As with 
drencher system, the section is formed by an area in one main fire zone at one deck. 
Each sprinkler section has a section- and alarm valve -pair within a valve center.  Ne-
cessary pipe segments between sprinkler nozzles and valve centers have been fire insu-
lated. The basic principle is shown in figure 3.4. (Appendix 5). 
Sprinkler indication is provided to three separate main fire zones. Bridge is 
equipped with main indication panel, ECR with back-up station and each zone has a 
sub-station. The stations are connected in a two way ring topology and the indications 
of one complete main fire zone at a time can be considered lost. That is to say, that indi-
cation of activated sections outside the main fire zone containing the lost space, remain 
operational. 
All of the current interpretations and regulations are met in Spirit of Britain: Section 
valves are sufficiently protected, indication is provided to operational main fire zones 
and hydraulic calculations are provided [10]. 
 
3.8.4 Fire main take-offs 
Fire main take-offs are special solutions assigned only to problems found during the 
design and building phase of Spirit of Britain. These include water protection for paint 
store, heeling room and “A” class trunk for port side shaft line. These arrangements will 
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not be examined further in this thesis as they can be considered special cases for specif-
ic problems. 
3.9 Fire and smoke detection system 
Fire detection system consists of two central units – at the bridge and in ECR. Both 
units are supplied with duplicated power supplies with an automatic changeover. There 
is a single fiber-optic data cable between the units for data transfer. If the main unit at 
the bridge is damaged, the back-up station in ECR will automatically take over the sys-
tem. 
Ship departments are supervised by 15 fire detection loops, 3 loops are used for in-
dication of fire doors and –dampers. Each loop consists of an address unit in each space, 
with connections to the sensors, and has a set of detectors and manual call points. The 
loop is connected to both central units. In case a SRtP scenario, the detection loop is cut 
into two segments by short-circuit isolators, isolating the damaged area. Both intact 
segments  are  automatically  controlled  by  the  central  unit  to  which  the  segment  is  at-
tached to.  If the communication cable between central units is damaged, some automat-
ic features (related to fire doors and –dampers), handled by the main unit at the bridge, 
must be manually operated from the ECR back-up unit. 
The fire alarm system is connected to several systems for automatic or remote con-
trolled features, such as: fire door operations, IAS for common alarm signal, internal 
communication system (PA system), control of lifts and garbage chute, fire dampers and 
ventilation, voyage data recorder, local extinguishing systems and fire patrol system. 
Fire patrol check points are connected to the loops and must be noticed during certain 
time intervals. 
The interpretations state that the system can be considered lost only in spaces direct-
ly affected by the casualty or spaces which are part of the same section. However, de-
tectors of the same section on other decks must remain operational. [10] 
3.10 Bilge and ballast systems 
In Spirit of Britain only the bilge system is considered to be under SRtP regulations (by 
the Administration). The bilge system is intended for removal of flooding or fire-
fighting water. The system comprises of a main pipe line, located at deck 1 and extend-
ing over the entire length of the vessel. Each compartment has smaller suction lines, 
with remotely operated valves, attached to the main line. Water can be removed with 
three different bilge pumps, located at the fore, after and middle of the ship. 
In normal conditions, bilge pump number two (located at the middle part of the 
ship) can handle the entire ship. If a compartment, containing the main line, is lost it can 
be isolated with manually operated bulkhead valves. Bilge pump number one serves the 
isolated forward part of the vessel, and bilge pump number three serves the after part of 
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the system. All pumps’ power supplies are duplicated with manually operated chan-
geovers, and all pumps can be operated locally. 
Bilge level alarm system is also under SRtP regulations and is built as fully redun-
dant. The redundancy is provided by duplicated sensors connected to IAS. Sensors and 
their cable routes for the same compartment are design never to be part of the same ca-
sualty scenario.  
The interpretations allow the use of local operation for the pumps if fixed or porta-
ble communication is provided [10]. 
3.11 Power-operated watertight doors 
Power-operated watertight door –system comprises of indication for the door status. At 
deck 2, between each watertight compartment, there is a watertight door. Each door has 
a limit switch unit with duplicated outputs and cable routes. Cable routes are designed 
never to be part of the same casualty scenario. The indication must be operational in all 
casualty scenarios, except those where the door is considered lost. The power and con-
trol unit for the doors is located at the bridge with two input ports and a changeover 
unit. If the primary signal is lost, the unit will automatically switch to secondary port. 
Status of the doors is shown on a specified mimic panel. 
The regulations and interpretations state that the status of all doors must be shown in 
all casualty scenarios which do not exceed the casualty threshold (Orderly Evacuation 
situations) except when the boundary spaces are considered lost (the door itself is con-
sidered not operational) [10]. 
3.12 Systems intended to support Safe Areas 
Designs for Safe Areas do not determine any operational patterns – only criteria for de-
sign. Certain system and equipment must be provided in all Safe Areas according to 
SRtP regulations. The reference vessel has three Safe Areas, all located in different 
main fire zones with direct access to embarkation stations. Transition between decks is 
provided for all main fire zones. According to interpretations, the space of Safe Areas 
should be designed in a way that on SRtP voyages longer than 12 hours there is a mini-
mum space of 2 m2 per person. On SRtP voyages shorter than 12 hours, the area should 
be no less than 1 m2 per person [10.].  
Each Safe Area has a sanitation system with public toilets – using sea water flushing 
system. The toilet flushing system can operate with either toilet flushing pump or sec-
ondary water supply from technical water system. The toilets are grouped into forward 
and after toilet groups shown in figure 3.5 (Appendix 6). Each main fire zone can be 
isolated via manually operated valves. The black water system is based on gravity and 
collected into two separate tanks, one for each toilet group. The interpretations state that 
one toilet for every 50 persons should remain operational and black & grey water could 
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be  disposed  of  into  the  sea  [10].  The  capacity  for  sanitation  is  calculated  and  proved  
sufficient in all SRtP scenarios. 
Water to Safe Areas is provided from potable water system. As a back-up, 500 milli-
liters of bottled water is stored with each life jacket. The new interpretations require a 
minimum of 3 liters of water per person per day. Additional water for food preparation 
and hygiene could be demanded, depending on operating patterns [10]. Each Safe Area 
has a dedicated food stock for instant demand. The interpretations do not determine 
what kind of food is required or any quantities for stocking [10]. 
Medical care is provided from the ship’s hospital and/or from a portable doctor’s 
bag, located at a first aid station in a different main fire zone. All Safe Areas are located 
indoors, ensuring shelter from weather and preventing hypothermia/heat stress. There is 
also one thermal foil blanket per life jacket stored as additional measure against hypo-
thermia. According to new interpretations, the temperature within internal Safe Areas 
should be between 10 to 30 degrees Celsius [10]. 
Lighting in main fire zones is arranged by double network with triple power supply 
system, with each main fire zone and deck having its own network system. Power sup-
plies have a living changeover between them, varying according to capability. Portable 
rechargeable battery operated lighting is acceptable in spaces not covered by a ship’s 
emergency lighting system [10].  
In Spirit of Britain, ventilation of Safe Areas has been excluded from SRtP scope 
under mutual decision between all parties (Administration, owner and shipyard). How-
ever, ventilation volume should be at least 4.5 m3 per hour per person if included into 
the scope [10].  
3.13 Flooding detection system 
Flooding detection system is arranged to supervise spaces on decks 1, 2 and 3. The sys-
tem consists of flooding alarm panels at the bridge, IAS, duplicated sensors and a load-
ing computer. Sensors are placed in watertight spaces below the bulkhead deck if the 
space has a volume which is “more than the ship’s molded displacement per centimeter 
immersion at deepest subdivision; or a volume more than 30 m3” [6]. 
All sensors are duplicated, with one sensor connected directly to the alarm panel and 
the  other  to  IAS.  Cable  routing  is  designed  in  a  way which  ensures  that  either  sensor  
remains intact, unless the space containing the sensor itself is damaged. Loading com-
puter receives data from level gauging system and dry space level sensors, and is con-
nected to the flooding system. The loading computer uses the information it receives 
from flooding sensors for calculations and estimates. 
In all fire casualty scenarios, except spaces directly affected by the fire, flooding 
system must remain operational [10].  
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3.14 Other systems determined by the Administration 
In the reference vessel, the Administration did not determine other systems to be consi-
dered under the SRtP regulations. However, with mutual decision, production and dis-
tribution of electric power and IAS were added as systems under the regulations. IAS is 
discussed in later paragraphs. 
As with the propulsion system, production and distribution of electric power system 
is complex and dependent on multiple auxiliary systems. In this thesis the basic concept 
is introduced briefly. There are two main switchboards (located in different spaces and 
main fire zones) both supplied by a set of individual diesel generators (two). Both 
switchboards can also be supplied by shaft generators when the vessel is on sea mode.  
This resembles the same concept as propulsion system with two independent main 
engine rooms and shaft lines. In emergency cases these switchboards can be connected 
together with a bus tie connection (other switchboard supplying consumers connected to 
the other switchboard if the generators are lost). Also, there is an emergency generator 
for emergency situations. The basic distribution network for SRtP purposes is shown in 
figure 3.5 (Appendix 7). The system is designed to sustain needed electric power for all 
essential systems in SRtP or Orderly Evacuation scenarios. 
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4 AUTOMATION DESIGN 
STX Finland AS (Rauma shipyard) is responsible for the basic design of automation on 
board its vessels. Automation as a term is used loosely as it is supposed to cover all in-
put and output data from measurements to remote controls, as well as fully automated 
functions. The more detailed automation design is done by subcontractors. At present, 
systems are designed individually and all aspects – including all desired I/O points – are 
decided by the system designer. Some systems are supplied by subcontractors with turn-
key principle – including all automated functions. Most ships constructed in Rauma 
shipyard use a distributed automation system – generally called IAS (Integrated Auto-
mation System). IAS is connected to some separate systems and is responsible for varie-
ty of I/O functions. Automation design in the shipyard is mainly focused on the basic 
design of IAS. Systems with internal automation are mostly handled by subcontractors 
and only connections to IAS are acknowledged. 
4.1 Current automation design process 
IAS can be categorized as a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) sys-
tem.  A SCADA system consists  of  HMIs  (Human Machine  Interface),  Supervisory  or  
Process Stations and Field Equipment, such as RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) and 
PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller) [13]. A SCADA system rarely controls any 
real-time processes, and in Spirit of Britain processes which need real-time control are 
usually controlled by independent sub-systems (such as main engine automation sys-
tem).  
At  present,  the  automation  design  process  for  IAS starts  with  the  client’s  contract  
specification. All systems are assessed for the amount of wanted I/O points under IAS. 
From the system assessment, the automation designer acquires an estimate for the total 
amount of I/O points for the vessel. After the total amount of points is estimated, num-
ber of points for different type of connections (hard connections, serial lines etcetera) is 
specified, including interfaces to independently acting systems. The number of opera-
tion  stations  and  their  locations  are  decided,  as  well  as  HMIs,  in  accordance  with  the  
owner. These decisions will evaluate the need for monitors, printers, mimics and so 
forth. From the gathered information, a realistic calculus is carried out for basic design 
phase and possible supplier negotiations. After successful negotiations with the supplier, 
the basic design process can be carried out. [14] 
The basic design process starts with raw information from the owner’s contract spe-
cification. After this, the shipyard prepares its own specification according to basic sys-
tem  designs  (shipyard’s  counteroffer  for  requests).  At  this  point,  the  system  is  fairly  
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realistic and almost all I/O points are known. This determines the number of I/O cabi-
nets needed and lays foundations for first version power supply and cable diagrams. 
When systems are more defined, an I/O list is assembled. From that point onwards the 
automation system is perfected along with system designs. All necessary information 
must be known before IAS factory tests for hardware and software design, done by the 
IAS supplier. [14] 
4.2 Design process and SRtP regulations 
The automation design process is incomplete when we look at it from a SRtP point-of-
view. At the moment SRtP ideology is only taken into consideration when designing 
system layout for IAS process- and I/O cabinets, and their power supplies. The system 
is distributed (process- and I/O stations) and system cabinets are located in different 
spaces to add redundancy (according to casualty scenarios). Cabin power supplies are 
duplicated and supplied from two set of UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply) systems, 
and redundant cable routes are designed in a way that they are in the same space only 
when in the space of the system I/O cabinet. That is to say, that power supply and in-
formation is redundant but control of a sensor/actuator may not be redundantly designed 
and/or connected to IAS. Also, the use of wanted features can be scattered around the 
ship without specific HMIs. 
In future SRtP development for automation, there are two main areas which should 
be acknowledged: 
 
a) SRtP decision making/aid by automated system(s) 
b) Automated/remote controlled actions for retaining system capabilities 
 
At present the decision making for a SRtP situation is done by the chief engineer of the 
ship with no aid from a specific system or centralized information. The reference vessel 
has a dedicated decision support system for SRtP situations but the system does not give 
any information to determine whether or not the ship must be considered to be in SRtP 
mode – it only aids with instructions after the decision to use SRtP features has already 
been made. That is to say, the chief engineer must visually observe the situation, rely on 
information from the crew and gather information from different systems scattered 
across the ship to determine if the casualty scenario is severe enough for use of SRtP 
features. This may take some time, depending on severity of the casualty, and auto-
mated assistance may be needed - especially if we consider the possibility that recovery 
time could decrease and insurance issues for misuse of SRtP features could become 
concerns in the future. 
The use of remote operations and automated functions must be considered as an op-
tion for retaining system capabilities and (for decision making), if the regulations be-
come stricter (for recovery time and the amount of included systems). In Spirit of Brit-
ain all  actions  to  recover  system capabilities  are  done  manually,  except  few valve  ac-
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tions in unreachable spaces. The amount of manual actions in SRtP situations is ex-
pected to rise in the future, whereas the recovery time will decrease. In the case of Spirit 
of Britain, the most extensive casualty scenario requires 39 manual actions [15]. The 
SRtP recovery time for the reference vessel is two hours during which the actions must 
be performed. Single operator simulations have shown that in some scenarios it takes 
more than an hour to complete all necessary actions. In new ships the recovery time is 
already reduced to one hour. This adds pressure to either use remote control and/or au-
tomated features drastically reduce the amount of manual actions with design enhancing 
or significantly increase the amount of operators. As so, the design process for all sys-
tems using automation must be developed further – taking into account the growing 
need of information for decision making, possible future need for control, and keeping 
in mind that these features must be redundant in every casualty scenario. 
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5 ANALYSIS FOR SRTP DEVELOPMENT 
Future SRtP development in Rauma shipyard can be divided into four basic categories: 
developing SRtP regulations and interpretations, developing ships operating procedures 
and capabilities in SRtP situations, improving SRtP system concepts and improving 
testing and support services. The STX shipyard in Rauma is part of IMO’s developing 
committee for Safe Return to Port regulations. As part of the systems analysis, the inter-
pretations were examined for system requirements (and potential improvements). 
All of the SRtP system design concepts in Spirit of Britain can be considered ade-
quate for current regulations and demands. However, potential developments in the fu-
ture  may force  designers  to  come up  with  alternative  solutions  for  systems’  structural  
design, wanted features and used design models. The decreasing recovery time leads to 
structural changes in systems or use of automated/remote controlled functions. Identify-
ing these systems is done by using different filters and determining which of the system 
concepts need improvement. As one of the solutions for system development is the use 
of automation and remote control, IAS and other related automation systems are auto-
matically considered as systems for further assessment.  
Systems are examined and indentified from the following perspectives: 
 
x Feedback gathered from the operators of the reference vessel 
x Existing potential for use of automated functions 
x Economical strain on current design because of SRtP regulations 
x How the system is designed to react when equipment is considered damaged 
x The amount of different manual actions for a system 
 
Due to the possible improvement of system concepts, ships operating procedures in an 
emergency situation are examined. This could lead to further development of certain 
systems and capabilities, beyond SRtP systems, as well as more defined regulations and 
interpretations. Finally, testing and support services were analyzed. 
5.1 SRtP systems analysis 
The amount of manual actions per system was calculated. Manual actions are taken as 
filtering criteria because as the time needed for locating and executing them greatly af-
fects  the  used  recovery  time.  The  results  are  presented  in  table  5.1.  According  to  the  
analysis, there are six systems strained by large amount of different manual actions. 
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These are: propulsion system, fuel oil system, fire main system, sprinkler system, bilge 
system, and production and distribution of electric power. 
 
Table 5.1. Manual actions per system [15]. 
System: Actions: System: Actions: 
01 50 08.3 33 
02 3 08.4 3 
03 4 09 0 
04 24 10 25 
05 0 11 0 
06 0 12 9 
07 55 13 0 
08.1 4 21 20 
08.2 0 22 0 
 
From these six systems, all except propulsion- and production and distribution of elec-
tric power system possesses potential for development of automated features or concept 
enhancing. In the other two systems, there are several different types of operations, lo-
cated apart from each other. This would mean rather expensive solutions compared to 
the current ones. However, propulsion system does have potential for improvement 
without automated features. The rest of the six systems possess qualities enabling easier 
options for development for automated features: manual actions comprising of same 
type of actions, actuators are located reasonably close to each other, the system uses 
same response for damage in most scenarios, and there is existing infrastructure nearby. 
Economical strain caused by SRtP features was determined by interviewing SRtP 
designing coordinators. From SRtP systems in Spirit of Britain, the following systems 
required substantial economical investment due to SRtP demands: fuel oil system, in-
ternal communication system, fire main system, sprinkler system and flooding system. 
These costs are mainly caused by the redundancy features or special equip-
ment/materials: fuel oil system needs reserve MDO tanks and a split booster unit; UHF 
system for internal communication requires a duplicated antenna network with leaky 
coaxial cabling; fire main and sprinkler system use three “A-60” rated trunks, multiple 
section valves and large amount of fire insulation for pipes and decks; and flooding sys-
tem has multiple sensors measuring the same values. All of these qualities increase costs 
for the systems directly because of the SRtP regulations. [17; 18] 
The Chief Engineer Officer of the reference ship, Mr. Vincent L. Todd, was inter-
viewed to determine the operator’s point-of-view for these systems. According to Mr. 
Todd, the propulsion arrangement for SRtP is good. There are, however, minor prob-
lems regarding the gravity and propeller hub tanks on deck 3. He states that the features 
for isolation and application of the tanks will most likely never be used. He reckons that 
the fuel oil system has some issues he would like to sort out in the future:  first being the 
possibility to use only one type of fuel oil. At the moment the ship must change from 
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HFO to MDO in SRtP situations. If in few years time car passenger ferries run only on 
one type of fuel oil, the SRtP concept should be upgraded accordingly. The second 
problem is the layout of HFO pipes between main engine rooms: at the moment they are 
placed on both of the far sides of the ship which makes them vulnerable in collision 
situations (possible flooding scenario). Instead, he would place them close to the center-
line of the ship. The personnel are very pleased with the layout for fire main system but 
think that some of the actions and the amount of pipes could have been reduces. The use 
of trunks however, was praised as an excellent idea. The same pros and cons were said 
about the sprinkler system. There were no issues regarding the UHF system, flooding 
system or the bilge system. However, Mr. Todd would have made additional suction 
lines for all spaces containing bilge pumps for additional redundancy. [11] 
As a result of the analysis, following systems were chosen for detailed revision: 
propulsion system, fuel oil system, fire main system, sprinkler system, bilge system and 
flooding system. Flooding system was chosen as a concrete example for economical 
calculations by the shipyard. 
5.2 Analysis for regulations and interpretations 
As part of the system analysis, current regulations and interpretations were examined. 
The main focus was to determine whether the rules allow possible future development 
of systems, and if the rules were realistic enough to allow economical and effective so-
lutions in SRtP designs. Few interpretations were found insufficient or incomplete 
(from designer’s point-of-view) and chosen for further development. 
The term ‘space of fire origin’ is not clearly determined. That is to say, all spaces 
are considered spaces of fire origin – except spaces listed in regulation II-2/21.3.2 inter-
pretation 8 [10]. This leads to additional amount of different SRtP scenarios from spaces 
not necessarily possessing any credible risk of fire. Instead, the ship’s spaces could be 
analyzed for realistic possibility as a cause of fire origin in normal conditions: possible 
sources for ignition (electrical appliances, self-flammable liquids etc.), fire potential 
(combustible materials), and volume of the space. This could be compared to fire-
extinguishing potential of the space. 
The other area is partially related to the previous. Modern remote controlled and au-
tomated functions are usually handled with electrical control signals. Some actuators are 
located in secured places, not considered as spaces of fire origin, which do not require 
fire-extinguishing systems (such as the “A-60” rated trunks). If these actuators were 
automated with electrical control signals, this space would no longer be considered se-
cure and would need fire protection from an extinguishing system. A certain vol-
tage/ampere reading or a certain type of cable solution could be arranged to allow the 
use of electric control signals and not causing a risk for fire. This would encourage to 
the use automation as a solution for certain redundant features, and enable its use in 
wider perspective. 
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5.3 Analysis for operating procedures 
There are few issues left open regarding operating procedures. One was the use of Safe 
Areas. The regulations and interpretations are set for designing Safe Areas but do not 
state any information for their using procedures. If Safe Areas must be used every time 
when SRtP features of the ship are used, it increases the threshold of using the designed 
options. Second issue involves decision making and the features themselves. The SRtP 
design process has been carried out by analyzing the ship’s capabilities space by space, 
and ensuring that systems are functional if that space has been completely lost by fire or 
flooding. This leads to an assumption of scenario based instructions regarding each 
space of fire origin. However, in real life the space is rarely lost completely and the op-
erators choose which features they will use, after careful consideration. 
According to Vincent L. Todd, Safe Areas are only used in cases where evacuation 
of the ship is necessary or there is direct fire/flooding contact or menace for the passen-
gers. This is influenced by the fact that Spirit of Britain operates on short sea voyages. 
On longer voyages, the use of Safe Areas could become a major designing and operat-
ing  issue.  Also,  he  states  that  after  all  fire  situations,  use  of  any  SRtP  feature  is  tho-
roughly considered. This is done by checking system capabilities and using redundancy 
only if something is not operable. Some of the features are very rarely used, even if 
there are suppliers’ recommendations to do so, whereas some of them could be used 
with relative ease. [11] 
For decision making, in Spirit of Britain, the chief engineer uses the information 
from fire detection system; flooding system with visuals, estimates and calculations 
from the ship’s loading computer (if flooding cases would be consider as part of the 
SRtP scope  in  Spirit of Britain); CCTV cameras and, most importantly, the personnel 
[11]. The advantage of the reference vessel is that it operates on short sea voyages and it 
has a large amount of personnel on board at all times. Gathering the needed information 
from the systems is easy on Spirit of Britain but he noted that may not be the case on 
other vessels – especially on ships with unmanned engine rooms. 
The use of Safe Areas and SRtP features varies with every ship. As so, the SRtP de-
sign process should aim for methods which are adapted to worst case scenarios but ena-
ble the operator to choose from the list of possible operations. The aid for decision mak-
ing should be designed for unmanned ECRs which would guarantee sufficient informa-
tion with or without adequate amount of crew on board, and to give sufficient informa-
tion about the use of Safe Areas. 
5.4 Analysis for testing and support 
Testing for SRtP systems is done in various stages, depending on the system. Some of 
the systems are tested in factory and/or supplier tests. Most of the testing (especially 
regarding  SRtP  systems)  is  done  in  either  quay  trials  or  in  sea  trial(s).  With  Spirit of 
Britain most systems were proven redundant before trials, with theoretical analysis and 
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evidence. Special focus was placed on features with double significance to avoid unne-
cessary testing (testing the same feature more than once). 
Most of the SRtP related systems were tested during quay trials. Separate SRtP tests 
were replaced with more extensive quay tests. All of the SRtP features were numbered 
with individual coding to ensure that all the features are tested and approved. Some 
tests, such as the changing from HFO to MDO, could not be performed during quay 
trials. These tests were carried out during sea trial. The sea trial is done to test and tune 
the ship before it is delivered to the owner. Sea trial test is as close to a normal operat-
ing environment as possible, and therefore gives valuable information on how the ship 
acts during normal running mode. 
One issue which was raised during the feedback was SRtP training. Mr. Todd 
thought that the shipyard could, in accordance with the ship’s normal operating practic-
es, provide better training for SRtP systems [11]. This could contain the use of decision 
support system, possibly going through different SRtP scenarios and explaining each 
system and their redundant features. The training would give background information 
on the theory behind certain solutions, and would compare it to real life situations and 
ship’s operating practices. Training would also prepare the personnel for the provided 
SRtP material for self studying. 
Separate support or training on SRtP related issues were not coordinated or orga-
nized for Spirit of Britain. Technical support of the systems is arranged under the war-
ranty agreement of the entire vessel. The information exchange between developments 
and matters was informal and happened during normal information exchange. The own-
ers  had  one  person  carrying  an  interest  towards  SRtP related  issues,  where  as  the  shi-
pyard had two project coordinators. Shipyard had tentative ideas to train their personnel 
regarding SRtP related topics but nothing concrete happened after first meetings. Train-
ing of the ship’s personnel is purely based on the materials (analysis, instructions and 
diagrams) received from the shipyard and handled by the ship owners – without support 
from the shipyard. Developing a training program for the whole field of SRtP could 
improve the quality of the product. 
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6 DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SRTP DESIGN 
CONCEPTS 
The development process of systems follows the concept shown in figure 1.3. User and 
system requirements were examined in previous paragraphs and now form the basis for 
new architectural designs. Feedback is gathered from system designers and project 
coordinators  along  the  way.  Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  reference  systems,  selected  
systems are exposed to the development process. The aim of this process is to find 
modular designs which could be used in all car passenger ferry types, and which would 
fulfill one or more of the following criteria: reduce manual actions and/or the amount of 
SRtP scenarios from previous model; is cost-effective compared to the reference model; 
enables a possibility for remote controlled features; and is feasible according to the cur-
rent SRtP interpretations. The process also acknowledges the ship as a single entity and 
ensures that the functionality of the whole ship in emergency situations is enhanced – 
through development of regulations (or interpretations), operating procedures, systems 
and testing. Flooding system concept is selected as a concrete example of economical 
calculations. 
6.1 Regulations and interpretations 
During the analyzing phase, two areas of the current interpretations of the regulations 
were found confusing or inadequate to support cost-effective and feasible SRtP con-
cepts. These two were the interpretations regarding which ship locations are consider 
space  of  fire  origin,  and  –  related  to  the  previous  -  use  of  electrical  control  systems  
without causing a secured space to turn into a space of fire origin. 
At present, by default all spaces on a passenger ship are considered a possible space 
of fire origin – regardless of its realistic potential as a source of ignition or its possible 
fire load. Only spaces stated in regulation II-2/21.3.2, interpretation 8 are considered 
spaces where the risk of fire originating is negligible [10]. These spaces include: 
 
x void spaces 
x trunks closed at all boundaries 
x cofferdams 
x tanks and chain lockers 
x some ventilation trunks 
x cross flooding ducts connecting void spaces 
x vertical escape trunks 
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x store rooms for gaseous fixed fire-extinguishing systems 
x bus bars enclosed in “A” class divisions 
x shaft tunnels only used for this purpose 
 
The present interpretation aims for a clear rule dedicating these spaces. All spaces can 
be reasoned to be spaces of fire origin with countless ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. However, it can be 
questioned whether this type of approach is reasonable. While this type of thinking def-
initely increases the level of safety by declaring that all spaces contain potential risks, it 
also brings up the design and production costs of systems with some unrealistic menac-
es. It would be more beneficial to realistically analyze ship’s spaces individually to ex-
amine the possibility of a fire in normal operating conditions (caused by systems them-
selves).  This  would  change  the  forming  of  SRtP  scenarios  from  a  theoretical  basis  to  
more realistic assessment of situations, and would, in most cases, avoid unwanted and 
expensive solutions in locations where they are not needed. 
As an example, a machinery arrangement diagram of the heeling room in Spirit of 
Britain is shown in figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Heeling room machinery arrangement [19]. 
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As can be seen from the machinery arrangement, the heeling room is basically a void 
(with a volume of approximately 1035 m3) containing few tanks (also in tank top)  with 
negligible fire risk, a heeling pump for the heeling system and two ventilation fan mo-
tors.  There  are  no  fuel  oil  pipes  passing  through or  serving  the  space  nor  is  the  space  
used for storage. There are cables going through the space but only few serving the 
space (having connections inside the space). The bulkheads and hull are made of steel-
based structures and alloys. Yet according to the interpretations, this space is considered 
a space of fire origin. As a result, all pipes, cables and equipment, or their segments, 
located in the space must be analyzed and designed redundant, and the space must be 
equipped with a fixed fire-extinguishing system. During the analyzing process, the 
whole space and all its contains are considered lost - when in practice, the probability of 
a self-ignited fire in heeling room, where the space is lost completely, is extremely 
small. 
Instead of automatically declaring all ship’s spaces (except the ones categorized by 
Interpretation 8) ‘spaces of fire origin’, all departments should be assessed during the 
early stages of the design process. This would ease the analysis needed during latter part 
of the process. All the spaces could be divided into three categories: potential, negligi-
ble and insecure. The first two categories would be used to eliminate the definite cases 
from the process (such as the spaces from Interpretation 8 or spaces always considered 
risky, such as machinery spaces). Spaces belonging to the third category, insecure, 
would be assessed more thoroughly. 
The assessment should examine at least the following things: source and risk of ig-
nition, fire load and materials in the space, volume and distances (heat transfer), and the 
relations between the three. Each theoretical elimination of a space, from the list of 
possible spaces of fire origin and due to this assessment process, should be proved ei-
ther by predetermined values, probabilities or reference materials. If the assessment 
would be conducted for the heeling room in Spirit of Britain, it would show that even if 
the space possesses a credible source for ignition, the fire load, distances and internal 
relations between them do not indicate that the whole space would be lost. The most 
likely scenario is a short-circuit in the electrical installations or a small fire at the pump 
or  the  fan  motors.  The  fan  motors  and  the  pump  are  located  relatively  far  from  each  
other, the space does not store any materials with high fire loads and the structures are 
steel based compounds. The probability of a fire, under normal running mode condi-
tions, would be very small. As a consequence, the SRtP systems should not be analyzed 
in case of a fire originating from the heeling room. 
One issue which is related to the problem regarding the ‘space of fire origin’ –
categorizing is the use electric control systems. According to the old interpretations, 
each space containing electrical appliances is automatically considered a space of fire 
origin.  This  effectively  rules  out  the  use  of  remote  controlled  features,  carried  out  by  
electric control signals - especially when actuators are situated at spaces with negligible 
fire risk. However, the new interpretations allow the use of certain solutions, executed 
according to specific standards, to survive casualty scenarios (such as the use of fire 
36 
 
resistant cables) and the reference vessel has an example of a space with negligible risk 
of fire containing electricity and contradicting the interpretations. 
As an example, in Spirit of Britain all valve centers contain sprinkler section isola-
tion and indication valves. The sprinkler section indication system is realized electrical-
ly. The same interpretation states that only electric cables (without connections) can 
pass through the trunk but later describes that section valves (always comprised of isola-
tion- and an indication valve) can be placed safely inside the trunk.  
One aim for future development should be changing the regulations considering 
electrical  appliances  and  signals.  The  use  of  fire  resistant  cables  is  a  step  in  the  right  
direction but the use of electric control signals should be made more feasible. This 
could be done by agreeing specific ampere or voltage levels (considered not to cause a 
significant fire risk); use of certain designs and concepts; and following methods and 
standards for electrical equipment in hazardous areas (ATEX directives).    
6.2 Operating procedures – Safety Center 
One of the problems with SRtP regulations is that the regulations are set for designing 
the ship. There are no guidelines for the actual operating procedures during real life 
SRtP situations. At the moment, handling different emergency situations is left entirely 
to the ship’s personnel. The personnel are trained for certain situations but mostly have 
to rely on information from safety cards or emergency materials. Additionally, there are 
no specific means for observing or decision making if a ship is/or will encounter an 
emergency situation - such as SRtP scenarios. Even though different designs and struc-
tures are carried out to prevent such situations, there should be a level of readiness if an 
emergency situation happens. Also, in emergency situations the use of Safe Areas and 
specialized system features are not clearly stated anywhere, and are decided on a case 
by case principle by the chief engineer (in Spirit of Britain) [11]. 
At present, the reference vessel has a dedicated decision support system for SRtP 
situations (instructions) and a separate Safety Centre for management in emergency 
situations. The SRtP decision support system is a specifically constructed computer 
program (on two fixed locations) which needs to be started if a casualty scenario occurs. 
The program only gives information and instructions after the decision for a SRtP mode 
is already made by the chief engineer.  
All passenger ships have a Safety Centre on board due to SOLAS regulations. When 
a ship encounters a SRtP scenario, it is considered an emergency situation according to 
SOLAS [6]. The existing Safety Center could be upgraded to assist and control all poss-
ible emergency situations the ship could encounter (fire and flooding situations, pollu-
tion, actions against the ship’s or its personnel’s safety, assistance to other ships etcete-
ra). The Safety Center concept would offer information both before and after a decision 
of an emergency situation is made – aiding the operators in decision making regarding 
the severity of the situation; anticipating and estimating future turn of events; giving 
instructions; providing communications; remote controlled operations; use of Safe 
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Areas etcetera. The remote controlled features could be chosen from a list of sugges-
tions, according to the operator’s wishes. Safety Center could provide data from opera-
ble propulsion systems and maneuvering capabilities, calculations for maximum dis-
tance or speed with one shaft line and remaining fuel supplies, a list of lost or malfunc-
tioning equipment or systems, anything required by the chief engineer and the captain. 
At present, most used systems on a ship are independent and are not connected and 
communicating with each other. This means that information and separate operating 
stations are scattered across the ship. The Safety Center at the bridge is a step to the 
right direction. It already centralizes some needed information, possesses means for 
communication and in some cases control. This concept should be further developed, 
first by making it redundant. A redundant Safety Centre concept would guarantee a cen-
tralized place for control and coordination in any given emergency situation, including 
SRtP situations. As an example, in Spirit of Britain, two Safety Centers could be ar-
ranged – one at the bridge and one in the ECR, located next to main engine rooms. Both 
the bridge and ECR are considered highly important locations for operating the ship. 
Therefore, these places already posses most of the needed infrastructure for a Safety 
Centre. Additionally, they are usually located afar from each other, in different main fire 
zones, and thus cannot be part of a same casualty scenario in the sense of SRtP ideolo-
gy. This ship layout for bridge and ECR is common in vessel types built in Rauma shi-
pyard and would guarantee redundancy for the decision making process. 
However, building two complete Safety Centers would not be cost-effective. In-
stead, the features of the secondary Safety Center could be reduced as it would be used 
only in situations where the primary Safety Center is lost. Ideally, the Safety Centers 
would  have  only  one  HMI  (per  Center)  for  all  features:  alarms  and  visuals  from  few  
screens, fixed communication options and one screen for instruction, estimates, infor-
mation and control. This would mean a move from older systems (with separate alarm 
panels and hard connections) to a more modern one (software based systems, program-
mable to any kind of need). The existing list of systems providing data, communication 
and control (shown in paragraph 2.4) should be complemented according to needs and 
owner’s wishes. The concept could be modified to apply to the ship owner’s normal 
emergency protocols. 
6.2.1 System integration and data network 
Before the new Safety Centre concept could be implemented, there lies a problem with 
system integration. Car passenger ferries depend upon numerous operations performed 
by different systems. Some operations are executed by IAS, some by individual sys-
tems. Some of the systems are interconnected and some work independently (only a 
common alarm to IAS). As systems may not communicate with each other in normal 
conditions,  there  could  be  complications  with  the  distribution  of  data  across  systems.  
Not only does the Safety Centre concept require information from multiple systems but 
it should also be capable of controlling some desired system features.  
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The SOSE approach should be implemented when designing these systems. Instead 
of concentrating solely on individual systems, the designer(s) should focus on systems 
being able to interact and share information, providing the ship with better capabilities 
and options. This approach would enable a sort of system of systems (with operators as 
part of the SOS) with greater interoperability between them. This would not only mean 
the possibility of exchanging feedback information but ensuring that a system, if re-
quired, could be remote controlled from a centralized HMI. Even if separate systems are 
integrated, the SRtP rules for redundancy in casualty cases should be kept in mind. This 
means that all required feedback and control signals should be redundantly achieved. 
According to Huovinen, there are four different levels of hierarchy in automation 
systems: Enterprise Level (ERP), Management Level (MAL), Process Control Systems 
(PCS) and Field Level.  Huovinen continues that MAL is the bridge between ERP and 
lower control and field levels, and therefore, key to system integration. [20.] In marine 
automation today, the closest reference point to MAL would be IAS process stations 
(and other possible equivalents in other systems). Hence, during automation design 
process, it should be verified that all necessary systems are physically interoperable at 
this hierarchy level. This requires good communications between the IAS supplier, sys-
tem supplier and the shipyard (system designer). Also, the shipyard should provide 
coordination and clear system concepts for Safety Centre and sub-systems during the 
basic design phase. The suppliers should be given a clear idea what is expected from the 
sub-system and if it needs to be part of the data LAN (Local Area Network). Also, the 
supplier for IAS should be chosen carefully. The system should support multiple com-
munication protocols and should be flexible for alterations to the original designs.  
This thesis will examine system integration more from a network point-of-view; that 
is to say, that all necessary systems should be designed in a way that they can be in-
stalled as a part of ship’s data LAN. The idea is to form a data LAN from IAS and sub-
systems  –  IAS  acting  as  the  basis  for  information  infrastructure.  For  example,  if  we  
would like to remote operate sprinkler section valves from a Safety Centre and receive 
valve indication data, we must ensure that a turn-key supplied sprinkler system is de-
signed in a way that it is able to communicate as a part of the ships data LAN (can be 
connected to IAS in a way that each section valve can be operated via IAS screen). The 
connection methods and techniques are left open for system designers and suppliers to 
choose from but some interest should be placed on the network topology, because of the 
demands set by SRtP rules. 
The integration problems with the first two of the OSI (Open System Interconnec-
tion) layers, Physical and Data Link, can be resolved by coordination between designers 
and suppliers, and using ISO/ IEC 8802 standards [20]. As the successful connection of 
systems on Physical and Data Link layers have been confirmed, challenges with other 
layers must be examined. This thesis will not thoroughly assess different solutions for 
this problem. However, as the SOS of the ship is heterogeneous distributed system from 
multiple suppliers - using different platforms, protocols etcetera - and due to the trend of  
ships using more complex, large-scale, distributed (real-time and embedded) systems - 
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this thesis suggest possible third party middleware solutions (such as DDS (Data Distri-
bution Service) or equivalent solutions) as an option [22]. Yet, other possibilities should 
not be excluded, and should be left open for system designers to consider on a case by 
case principle. However, designers should guarantee that systems requiring remote or 
automated functions are integrated as a part of ship’s data LAN and that the information 
can be transferred to fulfill all expected system requirements. 
6.2.2 Data network topology 
Instead of software based problems, this thesis focuses more on hardware and routing 
related challenges. SRtP rules state that the ship’s automation system must remain oper-
ational in any fire or flooding casualty scenario. To secure a fully SRtP redundant sys-
tem, there must be emphasis on the importance of the data LAN topology and how it is 
designed, as the SRtP scenarios are formed with a space-by-space related approach.  
This  thesis  examines  the  possibility  of  using  IAS as  the  basis  for  a  complete  data  
network. It is an existing system, distributed around the ship, and already equipped with 
easy connection interfaces to other systems (with normal suppliers). In the reference 
vessel  however,  IAS  process  stations  are  quite  centralized  and  I/O  cabinets  do  not  
posses networking capabilities (each I/O cabinet is automatically connected to both 
process stations). This could cause problems, or additional installation costs, if sub-
systems are  connected  as  part  of  the  network.  One  solution  is  to  further  distribute  the  
system, using more sophisticated RTUs with network capabilities and sophisticated 
connections (such as Ethernet TCP/IP). A more distributed and sophisticated IAS would 
provide more layout possibilities, system security (from SRtP point-of-view) and possi-
bly lower cabling costs. Yet, even if savings with reduced cable costs could be acquired, 
the more developed IAS would most likely increase acquisition costs. Economical as-
pect  must  be  kept  in  mind  when  designing  the  system.  However,  economical  aspects  
should not be the only designing factor, especially if system integration creates new 
possibilities and possible savings from other areas. There is a possibility however, that a 
larger network could cause problems in the future. These problems may be related with 
possible real-time processes working under IAS, and with network message quality, 
collisions and response times, depending on the network topology and used solutions. 
In this case, the scope for the assessment of the system network is defined not to ex-
amine connections to sub-systems and is instead defined to only examine IAS with its 
connections. According to the delivery specification, the reference ship’s IAS consists 
of two process stations,  a Safety Console and 7 I/O cabinets.  Two main operating sta-
tions are provided – one at the bridge and one in ECR. One reserve operating station is 
located at the after switchboard room. Safety Console and process stations form a logi-
cal dual ring network and all I/O cabinets have duplicated connections to both process 
stations (see Appendix 1). IAS is connected to following separate systems with serial 
line connections: Integrated Navigation System, Voyage Data Recorder, Remote Gaug-
ing System, Loading Computer, Remote Controlled Valves, Main Engines (4) and Aux-
iliary Engines (4) and to Propulsion Power board System. [2.] 
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Developing a functional concept for IAS network topology is challenging. Accord-
ing to Kenyon, designing a low cost, yet efficient, network topology relies on very 
complicated algorithms and heuristic techniques. Depending on the amount of locations 
(N), there is ܰ × (ܰ െ 1)/2 possible links and 2ே×(ேିଵ)/ଶ possible topologies for a 
network. [23.] For example, with 7 locations there are 2 097 152 possible topology op-
tions. This means that there is no easy way to secure the best possible option. All design 
processes  depend on  the  amount  of  locations  and  requirements,  called  constrains.  Ke-
nyon continues that a design process starts with supporting data, gathered during capaci-
ty planning phase, and a designer should try to satisfy certain chosen constrains, such as 
reliability, delay-throughput and costs. [23.]  
With a ship’s data network, one constrain should be added - redundancy. This, how-
ever, reduces the amount of possible topologies only slightly. If less sophisticated I/O 
stations are used, it reduces the amount of topologies but increases the amount of cabl-
ing. Sophisticated I/O cabinets, with network options, would enable a possibility for a 
mixture of different network topologies, such as a logical two way ring (figure 6.2) used 
between the process stations, but would increase the acquisition costs.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Two way ring topology. 
   
The advantage with the logical two way ring topology is that it automatically secures a 
redundant connection. Meaning, that in any cable failure scenario there already exist an 
alternative cable route. This means that the SRtP rules are already partially complied. In 
a cabinet failure scenario, a two way ring transforms into a C-topology and information 
is restored as long as the sensor/actuator is connected to at least two cabinets, it is lo-
cated in the same space with the cabinet or one connection is acceptably secured (fire 
resistant cable). When I/O cabinets are located in separate spaces and the ring cabling is 
carried out as straightforward as possible (cables between different I/O cabinets not en-
tering the same space), the system should survive all SRtP scenarios. Disadvantages 
could be problems with message quality and response time, geographical distances and 
possible cabinet layout problems (depending where I/O is needed). Also, it may not be 
beneficial to use a single ring to connect all cabinets but instead consider (depending on 
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the layout and distances) the use of hybrid topologies. These possibilities could be ex-
ecuted with several field bus protocols, using switches to form a logical ring. 
6.3 Propulsion system 
The propulsion system satisfyingly fulfills both user and system requirements set by the 
operators and regulations. However, the design could be further developed from both 
economical and SRtP concept perspectives. The SRtP concept for propulsion system 
does not seem to have potential for any additional remote operated or automated fea-
tures which it does not already posses. Failures are dealt with mechanical operations –
using only one complete shaft line (shutting down the other) and/or manual valve opera-
tions. Automated/remote controlled valve actions are, in most cases, not economically 
reasonable. Valves are scattered widely around the ship and in places easy to access. 
However, the amount of manual actions could be reduced with changes in the design 
concept. 
Two groups of valves should be examined more closely. First valve group consists 
of isolation and application valves for stern tube emergency tank and propeller hub 
gravity tank. These items are lost in scenarios where the RoRo deck of the ship is dam-
aged. The operations for isolation/application cause a lot of actions on very theoretical 
basis and severely influence the capabilities of the ship if applied. According to Mr. 
Todd, these features will hardly be used [11]. 
The use of gravity tanks depends on the supplier of the propellers. Gravity tanks are 
used to secure static pressure in the shaft line hub. As an alternative, there are suppliers 
who, instead of gravity tanks, offer pressure maintaining pumps. For the shipyard, 
gravity tanks have been used as a standard solution because it is easier to launch a ship 
into water with an incomplete shaft line (as, at that time there may not be working pow-
er network on the ship to supply the pressure maintaining pump). A pump model could 
be both a more economical solution and it could also reduce needed actions in SRtP 
situations. With careful layout design the loss of the pump unit could be coupled with 
the loss of the complete shaft line. Hence, it does not add SRtP features, only reduces 
them. Instead of multiple valve actions, only a duplicated power supply with automatic 
changeover for the pump would be needed. 
Second group of valves contain the isolation valves for instrument air. The use of 
instrument air for main engine rooms’ ventilation should be considered as an area for 
further development. In Spirit of Britain the fire dampers of both main engine rooms are 
pneumatically controlled, whereas the ventilation fans are electrically controlled. In 
SRtP sense, instrument air is only used for main engine room ventilation control. The 
control air is taken from instrument air system, which is connected to working- and 
starting air systems, provided from both main engine rooms and led to the funnel top via 
various  decks  and  SRtP  spaces.  Additionally,  the  piping  network  for  all  of  the  com-
pressed air systems spreads along the ship on multiple decks and spaces. A casualty 
anywhere on the piping network is considered to reduce pressure on the whole network. 
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Hence, there are a lot of isolation valve installations and analyzing work to be done for 
compressed air systems. This amount of work could be reduced greatly (or eliminated 
completely) with more sophisticated design concept. 
There are at least two options how compressed air systems could be excluded from 
the SRtP scope. First is to change from pneumatic control to electrically controlled sys-
tem. As this option would be easier from SRtP point-of-view, it would be more expen-
sive and less reliable in emergency situations according to the project coordinator [18]. 
The second option is to change the design concept for main engine room fire dampers 
and ventilation fans. The current reference system is shown in figure 6.3. (Appendix 8). 
In future vessels, new interpretations allow that the supply cables for ventilation fans 
could be installed from VMC (Ventilation Motor Control) centers up to the fans via 
main engine room and the funnel, provided that the cable is fire resistant. This would 
mean more expensive materials but reduced costs in working hours, as the route is 
shorter and easier for installation. This would decrease estimated total costs. Also, the 
pneumatic control boxes for the fire dampers could be installed on top of the funnels, on 
the weather deck, which is not part of any SRtP casualty scenario. Both boxes would be 
fed by a common instrument air vessel or an accumulator – also located on the weather 
deck. The vessel/accumulator would be connected to the instrument air system with two 
connections from both main engine rooms via engine room funnels, equipped with 
check valves. With this concept, the operation of both engine room dampers in every 
SRtP scenario is secured without any manual actions. As with the fan supply cables, the 
expenses for materials would increase but the total costs would reduce with saved work-
ing hours and shorter routes.  
However, there are certain criteria which must be met if the control boxes are si-
tuated on the weather deck. First, the area containing the boxes must be restricted from 
all passengers to avoid any misuse of the equipment. Second, the boxes must be suitably 
protected (sufficient IP classification). And thirdly, the used instrument air must be 
dried according to prevailing weather conditions on the ship’s operating route to avoid 
unwanted freezing. The basic concept is shown in figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4. Main Engine Rooms’ ventilation concept. 
 
From a more general point-of-view, the aim for modular propulsion system develop-
ment should be that full propulsion and maneuvering capabilities (with two shaft lines) 
of the ship should remain operational in all but the most extensive fire/flooding scena-
rios. The propulsion concept should be based on two shaft lines with four main engines 
in two main engine rooms (when reasonable/possible). The use of two shaft lines with 
four main engines allows redundancy both in SRtP scenarios and when maintenance 
work for propulsion system is needed. Basic design criteria should aim to reduce the 
amount of manual actions by design – meaning that the number of scenarios with a need 
of using only one shaft line would be reduced to a minimum, and manual actions is not 
needed except in the worst scenarios. This can be acquired with fire insulations on water 
cooling pipes, “A-60” rated trunks covering auxiliary systems as well as the shaft line, 
duplicated power supplies for auxiliary equipment and so forth.  
The same concept as with fuel oil system could be applied: splitting the propulsion 
system into two independent circuits. When possible, a complete shaft line with all aux-
iliary equipments would act as an independent system. For example, in Spirit of Britain 
the main engine rooms would function as an imaginary border for splitting cooling wa-
ter and fuel oil systems. Systems for port side propulsion line would use systems si-
tuated at spaces from forward main engine room to fore of the ship, and avoiding unne-
cessary cross-connections to starboard side system. In casualty cases, it would always 
guarantee one fully working shaft line, with the minimum amount of actions, and possi-
bly the other shaft line with reduced capabilities. 
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6.4 Fuel oil system 
The  fuel  oil  system  can  be  considered  adequate  when  system  requirements  are  consi-
dered. From operators’ point-of-view, there are few issues which need development 
even if basic requirements are fulfilled. 
First issue is the used fuel type. The main engines in Spirit of Britain (MAN B&W 
7L 48 60 [1]) operate with two types of fuel – HFO and MDO. HFO acts as primary 
fuel, whereas, MDO is used in start-up-, shutdown- and SRtP situations. The operators 
stated that the dual quality of the motor can be considered as both positive and negative 
characteristic - it gives more redundancy and options in malfunction situations, but the 
changing over from HFO to MDO requires additional work. According to the operators 
and machinery project coordinator the work needed for changeover takes up to approx-
imately 15 minutes (in SRtP scenarios). After the fuel changeover, the system requires 
little time to adjust and to provide the needed power for propulsion [11; 18.].  
The second issue regards to the layout of fuel tanks, equipment and piping. The 
MDO system comprises of two independent fuel supply circuits for both shaft lines, the 
border between main engine rooms acting as a boundary line. The fore and after part of 
the ship are equipped with individual MDO tanks, pumping- and booster units with re-
levant  piping.  HFO  system  acts  as  a  single  system  which  supplies  both  main  engine  
rooms. All HFO tanks are located at the fore part of the ship (day and settling tanks in 
fuel oil treatment room and reserve tanks at fore void spaces). The feeder & booster unit 
for forward main engine room is located at the fuel oil treatment room. For after main 
engine room, the unit is split into two where feeding unit is located in the fuel oil treat-
ment  room and the  booster  unit  is  in  the  after  main  engine  room.  This  layout  concept  
denies the possibility of using HFO in SRtP situations (scenarios where fuel oil system 
is  considered  damaged).  One  major  issue  is  the  HFO  inlet  and  outlet  pipe  routes  be-
tween the main engine rooms. These pipes must be isolated via manually operated 
valves when switching to MDO use – causing additional manual actions in SRtP situa-
tion. Furthermore, these pipes are located on both far sides of the ship (starboard- and 
port-side). This layout arrangement creates an unnecessary risk in collision situations 
(flooding situations) where pipes are more exposed to damage than the rest of the sys-
tem. 
When developing future fuel oil system concepts, changing environmental regula-
tions must be noted. One important, and current, alteration in regulations covers the 
allowed amount of sulphur oxides and particular matters in exhaust gases. At present the 
allowed concentrations should not exceed 4.5% m/m. After 1 January 2012, the concen-
tration should not exceed 3.5% m/m and after 1 January 2020 no more than 0.5% m/m 
is allowed. For North European Emission Control Area, (shown in figure 6.5. and con-
sidered an important marketing area for Rauma shipyard) the allowed concentrations are 
currently (after 1 July 2010) 1.0% m/m and after 1 January 2015 0.1% m/m. [24] 
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Figure 6.5. North European Emission Control Area [25]. 
 
The generally used fuel types for RoPax vessels are: HFO, IFO (Intermediate Fuel Oil), 
MDO, MGO (Marine Gas oil) and LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Ships are usually de-
signed to run on two different types of fuel, especially if they are primarily run with a 
residual  oil  type.  If  the  new  regulations  come  into  force,  the  use  of  HFO  and  IFO  as  
primary  fuel  types  comes  under  scrutiny.  HFO  and  IFO  are  widely  used  as  costs  are  
severely lower compared to the other options. However, the use of residual oils strains 
the environment above allowed concentrations if the exhaust gases are not processed. 
The exhaust gases can be refined with scrubber systems but the investment costs of 
would make these oil types less competitive economically. MGO, MDO and LNG sys-
tems are more environmentally friendly, and through recent developments are becoming 
less expensive. The main issue for system development process is whether the regula-
tions for air pollution are enforced. At present, the regulations are facing firm resistance 
from ship-owners. The owners believe that the restrictions will increase marine trans-
portation cargo fees to a point where land transportation becomes a more economical 
prospect, which would instead strain the environment far more than moderate regulation 
reforms for marine transportation. 
If the new air pollution regulation is enforced, the use of one fuel oil type would be 
beneficial from a SRtP point-of-view. This would mean that the use of residual fuel 
types would decrease rapidly due to high operating costs. As a consequence, the use of 
only one fuel type would streamline the design process: the layout of fuel tanks and 
equipment, pipe routes and the design for independent fuel circuits would be easier to 
design. Also, it would reduce the amount of work in SRtP situations: only the system 
itself would need actions in SRtP situations and would not necessarily require any ac-
tions isolating it from other systems. However, if the regulation is not enforced, the use 
46 
 
of primary and secondary fuel types is likely to continue. This causes additional de-
mands for system designers. The designer must decide whether the vessel should be 
able  to  use  both  fuel  types  in  all  SRtP  scenarios  or  whether  one  fuel  type  would  be  
available at all time. This could cause problems with the ship’s structural design and 
balance calculations due to fuel tank arrangements. Primary SRtP concept should be 
based on the principle that the vessel uses only one fuel type, whenever it is possible. If 
two fuel types are used, for reasons beyond SRtP scope, the fuel oil concept should be 
designed to operate with only one fuel type and its supplying system in SRtP scenarios. 
The use of either fuel type in every casualty scenario should be used only if the design 
is feasible and economically reasonable. 
The  design  should  be  based  on  two  working  shaft  lines  and  separate  main  engine  
rooms. Both main engine rooms should be served by independent fuel treatment plants 
and supplying networks. These networks should be cross-connected only when it is ab-
solutely necessary. Normal running mode fuel supply should be secured in other possi-
ble manners, avoiding unnecessary connections. However, the idea of independent fuel 
circuits should not exceed the security of fuel supply in normal conditions. 
6.5 Fire main system 
Fire main system currently fulfills both user and system requirements set by the opera-
tors and regulations, however, with a notion from the operators that the amount of ma-
nual actions could be reduced. The system however possesses potential for further de-
velopment – both as a concept and/or with remote controlled features. In Spirit of Brit-
ain, SRtP regulations have drastically increased the investment cost for fire main system 
compared to the previous system models. With a more simplified design concept, the 
user and system requirements could be met with lower costs and recovery time.  
With the new design concept the amount of sections can be drastically reduced 
without decreasing the operational capacity of the system. This would greatly reduce the 
needed amount of pipes and isolation valves, and most importantly cost of installation 
work. Due to new interpretations, fire insulation for distribution pipes is rarely needed – 
provided that the pipes meet the necessary requirements set by regulations. Also, the 
horizontal and vertical backbone pipes do not require any insulation or isolation valves. 
However, the use of insulation should be decided on a case by case principal with each 
vessel. This would mean that “A-60” rated trunks would not be needed to secure a 
backbone supply system (from fire main system’s point-of-view). 
In  the  new concept  the  backbone  system would  be  slightly  modified,  as  three  fire  
pumps would serve a lower horizontal pipe, situated at a lower trailer deck. This pipe 
would serve a higher horizontal pipe, below the passenger and crew departments on 
RoRo deck, via three riser lines. This concept resembles the reference system without 
the trunks and isolation valves between valve centers. According to the new rules, these 
pipes (pipes passing through but not serving) can be built as fire resistant if the pipes: do 
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not carry any flammable liquids, are of substantial thickness or “A-60” insulated, are 
joined by welding, and are adequately supported [10].  
The distribution network would consist of three modular types: crew and passenger 
departments, cargo areas and watertight compartments. The upper crew and passenger 
departments could be served by a single riser line and isolation valve per main fire zone. 
Each main fire zone would have one riser line which would have a connection to each 
deck level. One horizontal line per deck would branch according to the amount of spac-
es, and serve the fire hydrants. Each hydrant would have at least a pair of hydrants for 
back-up – one from a space in the same fire zone (if needed) and one in the adjacent 
main fire zone. The width of one main fire zone should not exceed 48 meters [6]. Main 
fire zones widths from 40 to 48 meters allow the use of standard fire hoses from adja-
cent main fire zones. In case of a fire situation at the crew and passenger area, after the 
fire has been extinguished, the whole crew and passenger section of the main fire zone 
in question is isolated – if the fire main system is damaged. However, the intact spaces 
of this fire zone can be served from fire hydrants of the adjacent main fire zones. The 
basic concept is shown in figure 6.6. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Fire main system SRtP concept – crew and passenger departments. 
 
The hydrant pairing is shown with grey circles. With standard hose lengths, the back-up 
hydrant can serve multiple spaces inside the sealed main fire zone. Location of the iso-
lation valves must be decided individually or placed on the RoRo deck (valve surviva-
bility is discussed further in the next paragraph). 
The cargo areas stretch horizontally across the ship and an entire cargo deck forms a 
SRtP entity. The hydrants serving the deck must be doubled with both sides of the deck 
served by a single hydrant. Hydrants must be placed at fore, middle and after part of the 
ship, depending on regulations and Class demands. In the new design each deck would 
have a specific vertical pipe line (or more, based on the pressure and flow calculations) 
from either horizontal backbone line - bearing in mind that the deck containing the up-
per horizontal line must be served from the lower line and vice versa (decks containing 
the backbone lines cannot be served from the same deck). The vertical line(s) would 
feed a horizontal line serving the specific deck and hydrants. As the horizontal line 
feeds  hydrants  on  both  sides  at  the  fore,  middle  and  after  part  of  the  deck,  the  entire  
SRtP space is secured. This concept is shown in figure 6.7. The cargo decks are also 
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equipped with drencher system, containing fire from spreading to adjacent spaces (ac-
cording to the interpretations). In case of a fire casualty, each deck can be isolated from 
the horizontal line’s section valve. This is acceptable due to the deck being part of a 
single SRtP space. 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Fire main system SRtP concept – cargo areas. 
 
The  watertight  compartments  are  the  most  difficult  to  protect  with  fire  main  system,  
following the SRtP interpretations. As the compartments need to be watertight, no hori-
zontal bulkhead inlets are allowed from adjacent compartments which rules out the con-
cept used in crew and passenger areas. The protection for spaces below deck 3 should 
be  designed  specifically  for  each  vessel.  There  are  few  basic  designs  which  could  be  
used as a basic solution. First is to use the riser lines from spaces holding the fire main 
pumps. These lines could serve each deck in that watertight compartment. Secondly, 
each watertight compartment would be fed by vertical lines from the lower horizontal 
backbone line (depending on the ship’s layout design, a separate line for each deck 
could be needed). All of the spaces would be served from these lines. According to SO-
LAS, vertical pipe lines from cargo areas to watertight compartments must be provided 
with  an  option  for  isolation  at  space  in  non-watertight  area  [6].  As  a  watertight  com-
partment can contain multiple spaces and no possibility for back-up hydrant from adja-
cent  main  fire  zone,  a  single  isolation  valve  solution  is  not  possible.  This  leads  to  the  
use of multiple isolation valves, according to each ship’s individual layout. 
6.6 Sprinkler system 
During the analysis of the sprinkler system, it was noted that the system is in accordance 
with both system and user requirements. However, from an operator's point-of-view the 
usability of the system can be deemed average. Even greater influence for the need of 
new designs is the production costs of the system. Most of the additional costs are 
caused by SRtP regulations - two reasons in particular: the amount of dedicated sprink-
ler sections, determined by regulations; and three “A-60” rated trunks, needed to protect 
the section valves.  
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The “A-60” rated trunks are installed to protect the sprinkler section valves. The 
trunks in the reference vessel also contain section valves and piping for fire main sys-
tem. As the trunks are considered spaces of negligible fire risk, the section valves re-
main operational in all casualty cases. All three trunks extend between decks 5 and 7, 
and are barely spacious enough for one person to operate all the needed manual actions. 
These structures cause considerable increase in the system’s production costs. Due to 
the high costs and optimized space for cargo, the trunks have been made as confined as 
possible. This leads to complicated valve layout, markings and usability. 
Other reason for causing high production costs is the amount of sprinkler sections. 
This influences directly to the amount of pipes and valves which enable the isolation of 
each individual section. The Fire Safety Systems code states that the section should not 
contain more than 200 sprinklers, should not serve more than two deck levels and 
should not be situated in more than one main vertical fire zone [26]. However, interpre-
tation 30 of the SRtP regulations determines that the section should not serve more than 
one deck level inside a main vertical fire zone (except stairway enclosures which can be 
protected by the same section) [10]. As the amount of sections is already minimized to 
the amount allowed by the rules, savings and/or user-friendly solutions must be 
searched from the design concept of the pipe network and trunks. The concept for fire 
main could be fulfilled without the use of the trunks, consequently a new sprinkler de-
sign could eliminate the need of trunks completely. One realizable solution is a modifi-
cation of a concept already designed in the STX Finland AS (Turku shipyard).  
Sprinkler system in the reference vessel protects all spaces (considered to need pro-
tection against fire) except machinery spaces (CO2 fire-extinguishing system) and cargo 
areas (drencher system). The design principle in Turku uses the stairway enclosures for 
vertical riser lines, instead of specified trunks. This design feature could be used to re-
place the concrete trunks with so called “virtual trunks”. The riser lines passing through 
stairways would be supplied by a horizontal supply line, on deck 3 for example, which 
is connected to the sprinkler pump unit (in low pressure systems) or multiple sprinkler 
pumps (in high pressure systems). Pump(s) lines must have an isolation valve in case of 
pump failures. The sprinkler system must have a secured connection to the fire main 
system,  according  to  Fire  Safety  Systems  rules,  ensuring  water  supply  in  emergency  
situations [26]. 
As the pump supply lines for the horizontal supply line are arranged, and the three 
vertical riser lines are provided in each main stairway enclosure, the design must over-
come a problem related to section isolation. This could be carried out by feeding each 
section with an individual supply line. The stairways themselves must be supplied from 
another stairway, to provide an opportunity for securely isolating the stairway section. 
The supply lines are equipped with isolation and indication valves, both located at the 
stairway enclosure. As the sections are formed by deck levels, the arrangement resem-
bles a tree-like formation. A simplified model is shown in figure 6.8.  
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Figure 6.8. Sprinkler system SRtP concept. 
 
However, one issue remains which could increase costs unless it is resolved with the 
Class. If section valves are placed in a stairway (without added protection) and it is con-
sidered to be lost in a fire situation, how will it affect the valves? If a stairway is caught 
on fire, only one section valve needs to be operated after the fire has been put out (iso-
lating the section formed by the stairway which is lost). The rest of the sections do not 
require any actions. This means that the operability of the section valves could be lost (it 
retains its current state) but not the valve itself. That is to say, the valve and its joints 
cannot leak and lower the system pressure. This would lead to a conclusion that the in-
tact sprinkler sections would not be fully operational and could be avoided, with the 
approval of the Class, if the valves would be designed fire proof (tested accordingly) 
and the joints should be welded according to ISO 19921: 2005(E) and ISO 19922: 
2005(E) standards [10]. In case Class will not approve this type of arrangement, each 
valve should be protected with “A-60” rated casings with internal water nozzles. 
If Class approves the survival of fire proof valves (not their operability), remote 
controlled features for valve operations could be considered. A valve control cabinet 
located at each stairway would control electro-hydraulic closing valves. The control 
cabinets would be redundantly connected to IAS and supplied from both main- and 
emergency switchboards with an automatic changeover. In all SRtP scenarios the valves 
inside the stairway enclosure could be remote controlled, except when the stairway it-
self would be lost. In this case, the valves do not need to be operated (except the stair-
way’s section valve which would be located in another stairway, from where the section 
is supplied). 
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6.7 Bilge system 
The SRtP concept for bilge system can be deemed troublesome for ship’s operators. The 
operations for isolation of spaces (bilge main pipeline) and the use bilge pumps are han-
dled  manually  (in  SRtP  scenarios).  The  suction  line  valves  are  operated  from  IAS  or  
locally in malfunction situations.  
Bilge pumps can be operated via IAS but in SRtP scenarios, the use of the pumps 
are instructed to be operated manually. This requires additional personnel, as well as 
good communications between the coordinator and the persons managing the pumps. In 
general, accessing the bilge pumps and operating them manually is relatively easy. This 
is however not the case with all of the isolation valves. There are three types of isolation 
valves, all except one operated manually. The first, and most common type, is a normal 
butterfly valve operated locally beside the valve. Some of the valves are placed in plac-
es which are hard to locate and access, even with sufficient markings. The second type 
of valve is a manually remote controlled valve (butterfly), where the actual valve and its 
operating location are not in the same space. These valves are operated with a fixed 
hand wheel connected to the valve with an extension. The third type of valve is also 
connected to the valve with an extension but operated with a special tool, located next to 
the valves. These operating places are located at cargo areas and, even if carefully 
marked, the access could be restricted due to cargo loads. The bilge suction line valves 
are electro-hydraulic non-returning valves with manual operation possibility in malfunc-
tion situations. 
The bilge system’s SRtP concept can be enhanced with slight modifications. The ar-
rangement for bilge pumps should remain as presented in the reference vessel, at least 
two bilge pumps serving the whole ship. These pumps should be located at the fore and 
after parts of the ship, connected with bilge mainline. Usually the after bilge pump must 
be placed higher than the bilge mainline due to the shaft lines and the ship’s form. Extra 
attention should be given in these cases to ensure that the suction power is sufficient for 
the whole length of the bilge line.  
The bilge pump operations in SRtP have been instructed to be done manually to 
avoid unnecessary analyzing work during the design phase. This could be avoided with 
few modifications and due to the new interpretations. In the reference system the bilge 
pumps have a doubled power supply with manual changeover beside the pump. This can 
be changed to automatic changeover, without adding too much cost. New interpretations 
allow the use and survival of fire-resistant cables, (complying with standards IEC 
60331-1 and IEC 60331-2 [10]) passing but not serving the spaces, in fire casualty sce-
narios, and the survival of cables (passing but serving) in flooding scenarios. This 
enables the possibility of a concept where pumps are operated from IAS. If the control 
cables are doubled from separate IAS cabinets, the bilge pumps can be controlled from 
IAS in every SRtP scenario. However, to avoid additional costs single control cables 
can be used, provided that the pumps have a local control possibility in cases where the 
IAS cabinet itself is lost. 
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The isolation valves for bilge mainline can be brought under normal valve control 
system with few modifications. The valves should be electro-hydraulic butterfly valves, 
connected to a valve control cabinet. The cables should be of fire resistant material and 
the routing of control cables should be designed in a way that the cable is only in the 
same space with the bilge mainline when connected to the valve itself. This means that 
the valve control cabinet should be placed higher than the watertight compartments, and 
that the cables are routed to the spaces vertically above the served space (whenever it is 
possible).  This  enables  the  remote  use  of  isolation  valves  in  all  SRtP  scenarios  where  
the bilge isolation valves must be used. In case of a casualty concerning the valve con-
trol cabinet, the bilge mainline and isolation valves remain in normal operation condi-
tion (that is to say, do not require any actions). However, for further redundancy, all of 
the valves can be operated locally with either a portable pump(s) or with specific tools.  
The suction line valves control can be executed with the same concept used with the 
isolation valves. Portable pump(s) is provided for redundancy. However, using local 
control  in  void  spaces  may  not  be  allowed  depending  on  the  class  society.  Access  to  
void spaces with bilge suction should be arranged via watertight hatches instead of bolt 
hatches, if the use of portable pump is allowed. In cases where the local operation is not 
allowed, other designs must be considered. 
Bilge level switches are examined in the next paragraph. 
6.8 Flooding system 
The current flooding system concept is based on duplicated sensors where one is con-
nected to IAS and the other to flooding alarm panel at the bridge. This design meets all 
requirements set by regulations but causes unnecessary expenses. With a different de-
signing approach, the system could be built with lower costs yet fulfilling requirements 
set by operators and regulations. 
Instead of using two sensors, individual cables and IAS as a back-up system, the 
system could be designed much in the same way as the loops in fire detection system - 
either straight under IAS (if possible from supplier’s point-of-view) or under a sub-
system. This would require two central units (process stations) located in separate SRtP 
spaces. Each deck, under the supervision of flooding detection system, would have its 
own detection loop, equipped with address units, short-circuit isolators and dedicated 
flooding sensors in each SRtP space. The isolators must be installed in a way that each 
predetermined SRtP space is automatically isolated from both sides during possible 
malfunction situations. The central units operate under master/slave principle and are 
connected to each other via fiber-optic data cable. If one of the loops is damaged, both 
intact loop segments are supervised by the unit they are attached to. The basic principle 
of the design is presented in figure 6.9.  
The concept is approved by Class in fire detection system and thus could be used in 
flooding system as well. This design enables the use of only one sensor in all casualty 
scenarios, and significantly reduces cable costs. Also, additional savings can be ac-
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quired if bilge level sensors could be coupled as part of the system. Bilge level switches 
measure the same value for bilge level alarms but for different purpose. In the reference 
ship, there are examples where four individual sensors (with dedicated cable connec-
tions) measure the same value for different purposes. The change of concept would 
mean that all the required information could be gathered from a centralized system and 
passed on where it is needed.  
 
 
Figure 6.9. Flooding system SRtP concept. 
 
The problem however, is the purpose of the alarm. Bilge level alarms are intended to 
notify personnel to start bilge suction when a compartment has been exposed to water. 
This is normally measured and indicated by a float switch. The sensor(s) has been in-
stalled to react to small amounts of water, for example in bilge wells. Flooding alarms 
are also measured and indicated by float switches but the sensors are installed to meas-
ure substantial water ingress into a watertight compartment. This is normally done by 
installing the sensors to 0.1-0.2 meters above the lowest point [27]. The flooding sen-
sors are used for common alarms and to notify the load calculation computer about a 
possible leakage. This information affects the heeling and ballast systems of the ship, as 
well as stability calculations.  
Both bilge level and flooding sensors are normally very simple micro switches. Due 
to the amount of sensors (135 flooding and bilge sensors in total), more sophisticated 
versions are not commonly used. If bilge and flooding information would be measured 
with same the sensors, this could lead to the use of more sophisticated sensors or indi-
vidual sensors for both purposes, and it would increase total costs of the system. In ei-
ther case, same design concept can be used. The use of flooding sensors for bilge level 
indication (and vice-versa) must be approved by the Class. 
The savings with the new concept are difficult to estimate, depending on the layout, 
system supplier and used sensor types. According to Lehtonen, savings become suffi-
cient if the vessel is a normal size car passenger ferry. If the vessel is smaller, yet classi-
fied as a passenger ferry, the old concept may be more economical [17]. A concrete 
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estimate of the total costs for both design concepts was conducted, based on the infor-
mation from the reference ship. The results are presented in table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10. Flooding  system evaluation. 
Old concept: Costs: New concept: Costs: 
        
Flooding panel 322€ 2 loop cards 600€ 
14 distribution boxes 700€ Graphics (Software) 1500€ 
24 sensors 2880€ 9 address units 1350€ 
12 IAS connections 4500€ 9 short-circuit isolators 300€ 
850m of cable (installed) 2975€ 540m of cable (installed) 1890€ 
System installation and   System installation and   
testing 3200€ testing 2200€ 
        
Total: 14 617€ 
 
Total: 7 840€ 
 
The costs for the old concept were gathered from the ship’s material information. The 
length of the cable was calculated from drawings and multiplied with an estimate of 
work costs per meter. The new concept was designed with one control loop handling all 
flooding sensors. The loop would be part of the existing fire alarm system. An evalua-
tion of the design costs were provided by the system supplier. According to the suppli-
ers, similar concept has been previously approved by the Class. As can be seen from the 
table, the new concept could drastically reduce system costs. There are three main rea-
sons for the decrease: shorter cable routes, half the amount of sensors and no back-up 
connections to another system. Also, the centralized information is easier to distribute to 
another systems. If bilge level switches could be installed as part of the loops, it would 
lower the overall costs significantly. 
6.9 Testing and support 
The testing protocol for SRtP related systems is approved by all parties involved: Class, 
owner and shipyard. The testing is based on a theoretical analysis of each system (over-
all, detailed assessments and FMEA). Solutions based on routing (pipes, cables) are 
proven by comparing the actual routes with the routes informed in design diagrams and 
analysis. Most system features are tested in quay tests when normal system tests are 
being made. Some tests are carried out in sea trial when it is absolutely necessary. 
One improvement related to SRtP testing could be made. The scope of testing is al-
ways narrowed to each individual system to avoid unnecessary testing (double testing). 
However, in most cases the systems are in interaction with each other. Testing should 
always be specified to test a certain wanted function, instead of concentrating on a sin-
gle system. If a feature is considered important, and dependent of another system, the 
test should be carried out so that the operability after the critical feature is proven. This 
includes all actions related to the feature, not just SRtP actions. As an example from the 
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reference vessel: when the after main engine room is considered lost, it paralyzes the 
port shaft line. This is due to the loss of port side shaft generators, situated in the after 
main engine room. To overcome this problem, the shaft generators can be isolated from 
the power train by dismantling shaft couplings from forward main engine room. During 
the quay tests of Spirit of Britain, the dismantling of the couplings was demonstrated 
(needed to be done in a preset time) but the operability of the shaft line was not tested 
after the operation. The main engine automation system prevented the shaft line from 
working, as the loosing of shaft generators resulted in a group of alarms categorized to 
prohibit engine start-up. This type of interactions should always be acknowledged and 
tested. This means that the failure should be modeled as realistically as possible and the 
testing should focus on operability of the ship/system, not the feature itself.  
There was no organized training or support for the personnel of the reference vessel 
on SRtP related issues. All the training for the ship’s personnel has been arranged by the 
owners, after the ship’s delivery based on the materials provided by the shipyard. Addi-
tionally, the shipyard system designers are not trained sufficiently for SRtP issues. Both 
the personnel of the ship and the shipyard designers should be subjected to adequate 
SRtP training. The system designers should understand the basis of the SRtP approach, 
as well as the newest interpretations. Most importantly, they should be able to recognize 
and understand larger entities in SRtP scope. As the regulations and processes for SRtP 
related systems take shape, interactions and overall view become important. This could 
also increase the possibility of system designers coming out with new innovative ideas 
for the related system designs.  
Also, the personnel of the ship should be given training and sufficient technical sup-
port already during the finishing phase. This could be arranged my mutual coordination 
between the shipyard and the owners.  Both parties would have a SRtP coordinator,  in 
charge of information exchange and coordination (operating procedures, theory and 
analysis behind each design concept). The shipyard would provide basic materials, ar-
gumentation and solutions to the owners already during the design phase. This way, the 
operators would be aware of the theoretical basis behind each solution. The shipyard 
would train one or two persons dedicated by the owner, and they would distribute the 
information onwards to the personnel. 
After the systems are installed, the shipyard would provide sufficient training and 
technical support for each SRtP system. When the ship is to be delivered, the personnel 
would be familiarized and trained, by the owners and the shipyard, for different emer-
gency scenarios following the owner’s operating procedures – already possessing the 
theoretical and technical knowhow for each system. This would ensure that the opera-
tors know how to maintain and use each individual system, and how the ship would act 
as a single unit in different emergency situations.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the SRtP interpretations, procedures and systems showed that the SRtP 
process (and the concept itself) is still under development. IMO, and its committees, 
must receive feedback from the field to adjust the regulations and interpretations to 
match the current needs and economical aspects of the operators and shipyards. This 
includes the interaction with Rauma shipyard, a feedback channel which the shipyard 
should try to use and develop. According to the research, the SRtP process used in 
Rauma shipyard could be further enhanced, especially from a system concept perspec-
tive. This includes better understanding of operators’ needs, acknowledging ship as a 
single entity in emergency situations, new cost effective design concepts and developing 
of testing & support practicalities. Developing the whole SRtP process ensures the best 
possible system concepts for each ship, and guarantees that the ship is prepared for all 
possible emergency situations. 
7.1 Regulations and interpretations 
During the development process it was found out that some of the regulations and inter-
pretations received from IMO could be enhanced to be more realistic and more suffi-
cient to the demands of the industry. These two main issues were determining spaces of 
fire  origins  and  enabling  the  use  of  electrical  control  signals  in  spaces  with  negligible  
fire risk. Both issues need development before they can be approved by IMO. However, 
the shipyard should develop solution proposals for these issues and present them in the 
IMO’s SRtP development group, STX Finland AS (Rauma) being part of (with Finnish 
authorities) the group. When possible modifications are proposed, the shipyard should 
see to that its own process follows the instructions from IMO (for example, cross-
reference between fire & flooding scenarios, and fire & flooding sensor layout). 
7.2 Operating procedures 
SRtP regulations are set to ensure sufficient measures for prevention and readiness of 
emergency situations. However, during the analyzing phase it became clear that there is 
no consensus for operating procedures if this type of events occurs. Prevention of emer-
gency  situations  of  occurring  and  the  sustainability  of  the  ship  in  these  conditions  are  
measures which reduce the probability of an emergency but do not eliminate it com-
pletely. Guidelines for operating procedures of a ship in emergency situations should be 
decided during basic design phase, in cooperation with the owner (such as the use of 
Safe Areas and SRtP system features). When the procedures are known prior to the de-
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sign  phase,  the  systems  can  be  developed  further  -  for  example,  to  assist  in  decision  
making, coordination and control. The approach allows the ship and personnel to work 
as an entity, improving the possibilities in emergency situations, and guarantying that 
the ship (and the personnel) is prepared for all kind of emergency situations.    
7.2.1 Safety Center, IAS and data LAN 
All car passenger ferries equipped with a standard Safety Center should be upgraded to 
a complete and redundant Safety Center concept. This requires a SOSE approach for the 
systems from the beginning of the design phase but brings out features beyond any sin-
gle system. From Safety Centers, all needed systems could be monitored and controlled 
(fire and flooding detection, and CCTV cameras acting as the basis for decision mak-
ing). Safety Centers would also contain all needed communication and alarm equip-
ment. Also, if automation and/or remote control are considered in SRtP scenarios, a 
HMI for different systems would be provided. As a basic concept for future vessels, this 
thesis considers the following changes and/or additions: 
 
x Two Safety Centers located in different main fire zones 
x More sophisticated and distributed process stations and/or RTUs for IAS 
x A logical two way ring (or a hybrid topology) topology used between RTUs, 
process-  and  operating  stations  when  possible,  and  when  all  other  system  re-
quirements are met 
x System integration coordination by shipyard 
 
More sophisticated RTUs would increase options for different layout solutions in SRtP 
sense. Using a two way ring topology, whenever possible, would automatically guaran-
tee redundancy in all cable or station failure situations. If a ring topology is not possible, 
or beneficial for some other reason, a redundant hybrid topology should be considered 
Power  supplies  to  IAS cabinets  should  continue  to  be  provided  by  two UPS system –  
securing power supply in all situations.. 
Data LAN and Safety Center concept requires good system integration between dif-
ferent systems. This can only be done with good coordination by the shipyard. As the 
operating procedures and emergency concepts are known prior to basic design phase, 
the system suppliers can be informed about requirements placed on interoperability.  
7.3 SRtP systems 
Based on the reference vessel, some SRtP system concepts could be updated. Further-
more,  the  concepts  require  modularity  as  each  ship  is  different  with  different  require-
ments and build. Yet, each system should fulfill requirements set by the regulations. The 
analysis showed that propulsion-, fuel oil-, fire main-, sprinkler-, bilge- and flooding 
systems could be improved with new design concepts. These concepts could lower the 
costs  and/or  improve  the  usability  of  the  system from operator’s  point-of-view.  Some 
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designs require the approval of Class, some the clearing up of future regulations. As the 
whole SRtP process evolves, the shipyard should try to stay one step ahead to be able to 
provide secure and cost-effective SRtP system designs. 
7.4 Testing and support 
Testing of SRtP related features is arranged well in Rauma shipyard. Most of the SRtP 
situations are managed with different cable and pipe routing which is proven without 
separate testing (during sale inspections). Each system and SRtP feature is tested during 
either quay or sea trial. However, testing should be improved by focusing more on why 
the feature is used instead of testing the feature itself. That is to say, the test should in-
clude the actual testing of the action/feature but it should also prove that it enables 
wanted system/feature operability. This could include interconnected systems beyond 
SRtP scope. 
Technical support is sufficiently provided during building phase and with warranty 
after delivery. However, support and training for systems and situations is not sufficient 
– both for the operators and for system designers. The system designers should be 
trained to fully understand the SRtP concept and the current interpretations. Main focus 
should be shifted from system oriented approach to system of systems based thinking. 
For this, internal training is needed. Also, training for the operators should be provided: 
First, by distributing the theoretical information through a contact person. Second, pro-
viding system and scenario based training for the operators. This would secure the safe 
use of each system, as well as the personnel being part of the ship’s larger emergency 
capability. Also, this would add the shipyards knowhow on how personnel want and 
must use certain systems/features in different emergency scenarios. 
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Figure 2.2. Assessment of passenger ship systems’ capabilities process flowchart [9]. 
 






